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 Introduction 
 Lawmaking is  – paradigmatically  – a type of speech act: people make law by saying 
things. It is natural to think, therefore, that the content of the law is determined 
by what lawmakers communicate. However, it is sometimes vague what content 
they communicate, and even when it is clear, the content itself is sometimes vague. 
As a result, the law is to some extent vague. In this book, I examine the nature 
and consequences of these two linguistic sources of indeterminacy in the law. 
Th e aim is to give plausible answers to  – or at least to help address  – three related 
questions: In virtue of what is the law vague ? What might be good about vague 
law ? How should courts resolve cases of vagueness ? 
 Many laws not only contain vague expressions, but contain expressions that are 
likely to generate deep disagreements over how to appropriately apply the relevant 
norms. Th ese expressions  – such as  ‘ neglect ’,  ‘ reasonable ’, and  ‘ with all deliberate 
speed ’  – are typically associated with multiple attributes that cannot be measured 
in common units, which entails that for many cases there will be no answer to the 
question whether the relevant law applies to them. As a result, the content of these 
laws is to a considerable extent vague. 
 Th e second type of vagueness in the law is primarily due to the fact that 
lawmakers and their audience rarely share much information regarding legislative 
intent. As a result, interpreters are oft en not in a position to determine whether 
or not the legislature intended the relevant law to be construed literally. Conse-
quently, it is sometimes vague whether the content of a law is its literal content or 
some non-literal pragmatic enrichment of that content. 
 Legal indeterminacy of these two types, I argue, is sometimes a good thing. 
First, lawmakers sometimes do better to enact law with vague content, and to let 
interpreters handle borderline cases if and when they arise, than to try to work out 
a more determinate alternative. Second, lawmakers sometimes do better to make 
it vague what the content of a law is than to not legislate at all. 
 However, we also have at least three good reasons not to overestimate the 
value of vague law. First, some of the value associated with the use of vague terms 
in the law is wrongly attributed to vagueness. Second, due to the highly contin-
gent nature of behavioural incentives, we should not overestimate the extent to 
which vague law incentivises people to take desirable courses of action. Th ird, 
because there is reason to doubt that courts generally have any special expertise 
with respect to underlying purposes of many of the ‘aff ected’ areas of law, such as 
tort and contract, we should not  overestimate the extent to which they are able to 
maximise fi delity to law in deciding borderline cases. 
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 Nevertheless, I argue, courts can oft en appropriately decide borderline cases 
by consulting reliable statements about legislative purpose made by lawmakers at 
key points in the legislative process. In particular, if lawmakers can be expected 
to possess relative expertise with respect to the relevant domain of conduct or if 
there is suffi  cient need to respect the legislative bargains that facilitated the rele-
vant legislation, then judges should – other things being equal – resolve vagueness 
in the law by deference to such statements of intent. 
 Th e Structure of the Book 
 Th ere is an overarching theme that binds the chapters of the book together, of 
course, but the aim is not to present a specifi c argumentative thread running 
from beginning to end. Instead, the chapters are connected by a particular focus  – 
on vagueness and law, specifi cally, but also on law and language, more broadly. 
However, although the book is not intended to provide a complete statement 
on the topic, I do hope it helps make piecemeal progress on a variety of closely 
connected issues. 
 Since most of the arguments in the book presuppose an account on which 
the legal content of a (valid) statute or constitutional clause directly corresponds 
to its communicative content, I begin  – in  chapter one  – by presenting the main 
components of such an account, grounded in claims about the nature of author-
ity and about how individual legal contents interact to produce the overall legal 
content of a given system. Such an account is of course bound to be controversial, 
so for those who do not feel inclined to go along when I move from claims about 
language to claims about legal content, it is perhaps worth pointing out that  – as 
even  Greenberg (2011) notes  – it is still the case that, on any plausible jurispruden-
tial theory, the meaning of a legislative text will be  ‘ highly relevant to the statute ’ s 
contribution to the content of the law ’. 1 
 While  chapter one concerns the general relationship between law and language, 
 chapter two narrows the focus down to vagueness, focusing on arguments by 
Timothy Endicott and Jeremy Waldron. Endicott has argued that vagueness in the 
law is sometimes valuable because some forms of human conduct simply cannot 
be regulated by precise norms. 2 In these cases, he thinks, vagueness is valuable in 
virtue of being a necessary means to valuable legislative ends. I argue that vague-
ness is actually not a means to the relevant legislative ends. Rather, vague law is 
a necessary consequence of an even more important feature of the law, which 
I call  incommensurate multidimensionality . Value, however, only  ‘ transmits ’ from 
ends to means, but not to necessary consequences of those means. Th is critique 
  1  See Greenberg (2011) 219. 
  2  Endicott (2011). 
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  3  Sorensen (2001a). 
  4  Sorensen (2001a). 
  5  Endicott (2011). 
  6  Marmor (2008). 
also applies to many versions of the popular view  – marshalled, for example, by 
Waldron  – that vagueness is valuable because it is necessary for securing valuable 
fl exibility in the law. 
 In  chapter three , I turn to a thoroughly sceptical view regarding the value 
of vagueness in the law. Roy Sorensen has argued that it is a mistake to think 
that vagueness has a constructive function in law, such as delegating limited 
lawmaking power to offi  cials. 3 It merely  appears to be functional, he says, due to  ‘ a 
cluster of logical and linguistic errors ’ about its nature. 4 In response to Sorensen ’ s 
argument, which threatens to take away what is traditionally thought to be the 
main reason for thinking that vagueness in the law can be a good thing, I argue 
that lawmakers sometimes do better to enact vague law  – and thus to delegate 
limited lawmaking power to agencies and courts  – than to set simple bright-line 
rules or to work out complex precise alternatives. 
 In  chapter four , I continue to examine the power-delegating value of vagueness 
in the law, but my primary concern will be the relationship between  vagueness, 
uncertainty and (desirable) behaviour, focusing on arguments by Endicott, 
Sorensen and Gillian Hadfi eld. Endicott argues, for example, that vague law allows 
the courts to work out the details of the law, which may be preferable in domains 
where the courts satisfy certain competence conditions, and that vague law can 
give people incentive to avoid creating risk to others or to contract out of liabilities 
in cost-eff ective ways. 5 Although I agree with certain aspects of Endicott ’ s view, 
I argue that due attention to issues like the highly contingent nature of behavioural 
incentive and the limits of judicial competence shows that the value of vagueness 
in the law should not be overestimated. I also address Sorensen ’ s concerns about 
whether uncertainty about liability in fact gives people a valuable behavioural 
incentive, since his argument raises important general worries about one of the 
main grounds on which vagueness has been taken to be valuable to law, especially 
by scholars infl uenced by law and economics, including Hadfi eld (and, to some 
extent, Endicott). 
 Chapters two to  four concern the value of using vague terms in legislation. We 
can call this vagueness  of content. In  chapter fi ve , I turn to another  – somewhat 
neglected  – form of vagueness: vagueness  about content. As I aim to show, not 
only is the content of a legislative utterance oft en vague, it is oft en vague what the 
content of such an utterance is. Th e starting point for this discussion is the simple 
observation that in ordinary conversational settings it frequently happens that 
speakers assert something other than what they literally say. Given the ubiquity 
of this phenomenon, it makes sense to ask whether it also frequently happens that 
 legislatures assert something other than what they literally say. 
 Andrei Marmor has argued that non-literal legislative speech is rare. 6  According 
to Marmor, a speaker succeeds in asserting something other than what she literally 
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says only if it is obvious that she cannot be intending to assert the literal content 
of her remark. And that rarely happens in law, he says. I argue that the epistemic 
constraint on non-literal assertion is oft en lower than Marmor holds  – although 
its exact  ‘ height ’ may (like standards of proof) vary between legal domains. I also 
argue, however, that Marmor ’ s argument can be fruitfully revised: the content of a 
statutory directive is rarely determinately diff erent from its literal content, due to 
the fact that legislative contexts generally contain little unequivocal information 
about legislative intent. 
 Th e fact that the conversational background in the legislative speech context 
generally isn ’ t rich enough to warrant a reinterpretation, however, does not entail 
that the content of the law is  – by default  – its literal content. I argue that once we 
analyse all the relevant pragmatic aspects of legislative utterances, we see that there 
is plenty of room for indeterminacy about utterance content on the framework 
I adopt. Th e basic idea is that in certain cases in which the audience is warranted in 
withholding belief regarding the speaker ’ s communicative intention, the primary 
content of the relevant utterance is indeterminate between the literal content of 
the sentence uttered and some non-literal enrichment thereof. Th is has signifi cant 
consequences for the analysis of a number of important but controversial legal 
cases, which I discuss in some detail. 
 Given what I say in  chapters one and  fi ve , in particular, my view may seem 
to imply a version of textualism. And, as I discuss in  chapter six , in one sense it 
does, at least insofar as textualism is taken to be a theory of legal  content rather 
than legal  interpretation (on the understanding that legal interpretation is the act 
of developing the law in the face of indeterminate/inconsistent legal content or a 
particularly problematic result). Textualism, however, is more than just a theory 
about legal content  – it is primarily a normative theory of adjudication of which 
such a theory is a part. And as I explain, my view diff ers signifi cantly from full-
fl edged textualism. Part of the reason is that I think that legal content is oft en less 
determinate than textualist rhetoric suggests. Mainly, however, the diff erence is 
that I don ’ t think that the standard textualist considerations support their limited 
view of the judge ’ s role in all cases in which interpretation is called for. 
 In  chapter seven , I conclude my main discussion by arguing that  interpreters 
can use similar strategies to resolve the two types of vagueness that I have 
discussed: sometimes, the law ’ s background purpose(s) will dictate a decision. 
However, I also argue that there are signifi cant restrictions on the sort of back-
ground rationale that courts can legitimately appeal to, at least insofar as the aim 
is to maximise fi delity to law. I propose that such appeal is restricted to what I call 
the  operative rationale of the law: roughly, justifi cation that lawmakers are willing 
to off er publicly under sincerity-inducing conditions. 
 It is one thing, however, to say that borderline cases  can be settled by refer-
ence to legislative purposes and another to say that they  should , and so we need 
to consider what normative reasons judges might have to resolve cases of vague-
ness on the basis of the relevant statute ’ s background justifi cation. I think that 
there are at least two types of reason for such deference. First, judges can have 
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authority-based reasons to defer to legislative intentions, if the legislature can be 
expected to possess expertise regarding the relevant domain of conduct. Second, 
however, judges may also have non-expertise-based reasons to defer to the legis-
lature ’ s intentions in borderline cases. I argue that one of the strongest reasons 
in favour of resolving borderline cases by reference to legislative rationale is that 
doing so respects legislative bargaining and thereby helps preserve a fundamental 
feature of the legislative institution. 
 Th us, although the book is primarily about specifi c questions regarding the 
nature and value of vagueness in the law, the discussion hopefully also sheds 
signifi cant light on other important issues in jurisprudence. It will emerge  – in 
particular from  chapters one ,  six and  seven  – that two of the leading theories of 
legal interpretation in a signifi cant sense oft en complement  – rather than compete 
with  – each other. If what I say in these chapters is correct, a sophisticated version 
of textualism is the best theory of legal content  – the content of the law is deter-
mined by what the legislature can reasonably be taken to have said  – while a 
constrained version of intentionalism is oft en the best theory of legal interpre-
tation in borderline cases  – in cases of vagueness, the law should sometimes be 
precisifi ed in accordance with the justifi cation that lawmakers are willing to off er 
publicly under sincerity-inducing conditions. 
 Chapter eight , meant to be read in tandem with  chapter one , is perhaps a bit 
more like an appendix than a chapter, but I have decided to include it here due to 
the way it connects the specifi c topic of the main discussion (vagueness) back to 
the more general topic of law and language. In the chapter, I focus on an argument 
by Scott Soames for the claim that facts about legal practice can in an important 
sense adjudicate between rival theories of vagueness. 7 If he is right, that ’ s excit-
ing both from the point of view of philosophy of law and philosophy of language. 
Th e argument is also likely to generate considerable optimism about what else we 
might expect to learn about language by looking at the law. 
 Th e purpose of the chapter is to signifi cantly temper any such expectations, by 
arguing that  – for reasons explained in  chapter one  – we have to give up the one 
premise of Soames ’ s argument that he seems to take to be uncontroversial: that 
the legal content of a statute or constitutional clause is  identical with its commu-
nicative content. I argue that due to the need for a fairly complex account of the 
relationship between communicative content and legal content, we should  – as 
a general matter  – be quite cautious about drawing general conclusions about 
language on the basis of facts about legal practice. 
 
  7  See Soames (2012). 
  1  See Greenberg (2011b) 217 ff . 
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 Authority, Communication 
and Legal Content 
 As I mentioned in the Introduction, the majority of the arguments in this book 
presuppose an account of legal content on which the legal content of a (valid) 
statute or constitutional clause directly corresponds to its communicative content. 
Following Mark Greenberg, let ’ s call any view that embraces such an account a 
version of the  communicative-content theory of law . 1 In this chapter, I develop a 
specifi c version of this theory  – fi rst sketched in Asgeirsson (2016)  – grounded 
in claims about the nature of authority and about how individual legal contents 
interact to produce the overall legal content of a given system. 
 Recently, the communicative-content theory has come under serious  pressure 
from several philosophers of law and legal scholars  – including Greenberg, 
Lawrence Solum, and Dale Smith  – who point out that legal textbooks are full of 
examples in which there appears to be some clear diff erence between the commu-
nicative content of a statute or constitutional clause and its legal content; a  ‘ gap ’, if 
you will. We can call this the  Gappiness Problem for the communicative-content 
theory of law (keeping in mind that the apparent gaps here are gaps in the  theory ’ s 
explanation of legal content and not gaps in the law itself). I argue that the  problem 
raised by these examples gives us good reason to reject certain versions of the 
communicative-content theory, but hope to show that the account of legal content 
I provide  – the  Pro Tanto view , as I call it  – manages to avoid the problem by 
 allowing us to explain away the apparent gaps in a principled and unifi ed way. 
 I also hope to show how the Pro Tanto account fi ts into a wider jurisprudential 
picture, both by noting its consequences for the individuation of legal obliga-
tions, powers, permissions, etc and, more foundationally, by linking it up with 
a  conception of authority on which one of the central functions of law is to help 
subjects better comply with the reasons that apply to them. Given that, in so doing, 
I will be moving through several of the most prominent jurisprudential issues of 
the past century or so (authority, semantics and pragmatics of legal statements, 
legal content, legal normativity, legislative intention), a full defence of the  resulting 
jurisprudential framework will require a book of its own, but I can at least take a 
chapter here to provide a robust and fairly comprehensive overview of its main 
components. 
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  2  As I ’ m sure will become obvious to some readers, the positive view developed and partially 
defended here owes a great deal to a constellation of contributions to the general jurisprudence debate 
made by Joseph Raz and Andrei Marmor, and to work by Scott Shapiro and John Gardner. I should also 
note that my thinking here has been particularly infl uenced, in one way or another, by recent work by 
Marmor, Mitch Berman, David Plunkett, Daniel Wodak, Richard Ekins, Samuele Chilovi and George 
Pavlakos. In addition, Barbara Baum Levenbook ’ s thoughtful engagement with the ideas presented here 
has also been important for their development. 
  3  Here, I set aside the complication that on some views, constitution  is identity, and on others, 
constitution is a type of grounding. 
 I should emphasise, though, that although I hope to make some modest contri-
butions along the way, the aim in this chapter is not to produce a philosophically 
newsworthy, wholesale account of the nature and normativity of law, but rather to 
show, as transparently as possible, the way in which the communicative-content 
theory is supposed to get its force. What this means, in part, is that many interest-
ing issues, closely connected to what I discuss here, will have to be left  for another 
occasion, or addressed only very briefl y and/or at a fairly high level of abstraction. 
But, hopefully, we will at least have a plausible picture on which it is true  – and 
in some signifi cant sense necessarily so  – that the legal content of a statute or 
 constitutional clause directly corresponds to its communicative content. 2 
 I. Th e Communicative-Content 
Th eory of Law and Its (Recent) Critics 
 Before I go on to discuss the problems for the communicative-content theory 
raised by Greenberg, Solum, and Smith, I should note that it is not always 
clear exactly what relation proponents of the theory take to obtain between the 
two  types of content. It might be a metaphysically  ‘ tight ’ relation like iden-
tity or constitution, or it might be a slightly  ‘ looser ’ relation like grounding or 
 supervenience. 3 What they share, however, is the view that the legal content of a 
statute or constitutional clause in some relevant sense  directly corresponds to its 
communicative content. 
 It is also not always clear what people mean when they talk about the legal 
content of a statute or constitutional clause. Sometimes, it seems to refer simply 
to the legally relevant propositional content of the authoritative utterance in ques-
tion, which makes sense if the relation between communicative content and legal 
content is taken to be one of identity or constitution. Legally authoritative utter-
ances, however, do more than simply represent what legal obligations, powers, 
permissions, etc we have in virtue of the law being what it is; they also create them, 
which is why we can speak about the  ‘ eff ect ’ that the enactment of a statute or 
constitutional clause has on the law. It seems appropriate, therefore, to identify 
the legal content of a statute or constitutional clause with the contribution that it 
makes to our legal obligations, powers, permissions, etc. 
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  4  Dancy (2000) 115. 
  5  See eg Schroeder (2007), Lord (2008) and Morganti and Tanyi (ms); but see also Mantel (2015) for 
a recent critique of propositional accounts of reasons. 
 Already, this presents a  prima facie problem for certain versions of the 
communicative-content theory. Th e communicative content of a statute or consti-
tutional clause is  – depending on one’s view about linguistic content  – a set of 
possible worlds, an abstract information-carrying object (typically, an  n -tuple of 
objects and properties, or  – more recently  – objects and properties bound together 
by some structure-providing relation), or a representational cognitive act-type. 
But the legal content of such a provision, I have said, is its contribution to the 
law  – ie a legal obligation, power, permission, etc (or set thereof). Metaphysically, 
therefore, these two types of content appear to be quite distinct. If that is correct, 
it cannot be the case that the legal content of such a provision is identical with, or 
constituted by, its communicative content. Or so the worry goes. 
 Th is is an important worry, to be sure. But it is neither novel nor necessarily 
fatal. Th e most promising way to respond to this charge of  ‘ category mistake ’, it 
seems to me, is to try to parallel replies to a similar objection in metaethics, to 
the eff ect that reasons can ’ t be propositions because  ‘ they are the wrong sort of 
beast ’. 4 As many authors have pointed out, there are  –  contra critics ’ appeal to 
 intuition  – several refi ned ways to make fairly palatable the idea that reasons can 
be propositions. 5 We might therefore be able to make equally palatable the idea 
that legal obligations, powers, permissions, etc are propositions, too. For one, 
it would be rather odd if propositions could constitute one type of normative 
phenomenon but not another, unless we have some special, yet-to-be-identifi ed 
reason to believe that reasons are somehow importantly diff erent from obliga-
tions, powers, permissions, etc or that specifi cally legal-normative phenomena are 
somehow importantly diff erent from  ‘ ordinary ’ normative phenomena. 
 We may, of course, not be persuaded by this response, and still be inclined to 
believe that, whatever they turn out to be, legal-normative phenomena defi nitely 
aren ’ t propositions. I will return to this issue further below, but for our more imme-
diate purposes here, we do not need to settle this particular matter, since there are 
other, more decisive reasons to believe that legal content is not identical with, or 
constituted by, communicative content. As I argue below, all-in-all, the Gappiness 
Problem is persuasive against identity-based versions of the communicative-
content theory and provides a strong case against constitution-based versions 
(although a lot depends here on what we take the constitution relation to require; 
more on this below). Th is leaves grounding- and supervenience-based views. Since 
supervenience claims suff er from known explanatory shortcomings, I propose 
a version of the communicative-content theory on which the fact that the legal 
content of a statute or constitutional clause directly corresponds to its commu-
nicative content is grounded in facts about the nature of authoritative expression 
and the constitutive rules of legal systems. If successful, the Pro Tanto view about 
legal content both avoids the category-mistake problem and allows us to provide 
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  6  Greenberg (2011a) 72. 
  7  ibid, 76. 
  8  US Const Am 1. 
  9  See Solum (2013b) 20; see also Solum (2013a). 
  10  Solum (2013b) 20. 
a principled and unifi ed response to the Gappiness Problem, while preserving a 
robust version of the communicative-content theory. 
 A. Some Apparent  ‘ Gaps ’ between Communicative Content 
and Legal Content 
 As I have indicated, what recent critics of the communicative-content theory have 
in common is that they direct our attention to run-of-the-mill examples in which 
legal practice indicates that there is some clear diff erence between the communica-
tive content of the relevant legal provisions and their legal content. Insofar as the 
actual practice of skilled practitioners is good evidence of the relation between 
legal texts and the content of law, this means trouble for the communicative-
content theory. 6 
 Greenberg (2011a) points out, among other things, that in the United States, 
the requirement of  mens rea is presumed to be part of any rule specifying a crimi-
nal off ence, even if the language of the provision contains no such requirement. 
 ‘ It would be a strain ’, he says,  ‘ to argue that  mens rea requirements are somehow 
part of the linguistic content of criminal statutes, whatever their wording and 
whatever the circumstances of their enactment. ’ 7 Rather, in Greenberg ’ s view, the 
common law presumption modifi es the legal content of statutes whose language 
does not contain the relevant requirement, and does so without thereby modi-
fying their communicative content. Th us, if Greenberg is right, there is a gap 
between the communicative content of such criminal law statutes and their legal 
content. 
 At the constitutional level, Solum (2013a; 2013b) has pointed out that the legal 
content of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution appears to be consider-
ably richer than its communicative content, due to the development of associated 
doctrines of constitutional law. For example, constitutional doctrine surrounding 
the First Amendment provides the legal landscape with rules concerning expres-
sion via billboards and notions such as  prior restraint , neither of which can be said 
to be part of the communicative content of the relevant constitutional text  – ie that 
 ‘ Congress shall make no law  … abridging the freedom of speech ’. 8 Nevertheless, 
both are typically taken to be part of the legal content of the First Amendment; the 
relevant doctrines, Solum says,  ‘ provide the  “ legal content ” of the First Amendment 
freedom of speech ’. 9 According to Solum, it is therefore  ‘ clear that [communicative 
content and legal content] are not identical ’, since the former  ‘ does not contain the 
elaborate structure of free-speech doctrine ’. 10 
10 Authority, Communication and Legal Content
  11  See Solum (2008) 7. 
  12  Smith (ms) 21. 
  13  Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 32(1). 
  14  Similar reasoning, I think, applies in the case of the Canadian Federal Interpretation Act, which 
specifi es that  ‘ [e]very enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal 
construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects ’. See the Canadian Federal 
Interpretation Act, RS, c I-23, s 11. 
  15  See eg Manning (2003) 2467. See also Ekins and Goldsworthy (2014) 56. 
 Adding to the examples supplied by Greenberg and Solum, Smith (ms) delivers 
what is perhaps the most direct blow to identity- and constitution-based versions 
of the communicative-content theory. First, Smith  – elaborating on a point made 
by Solum (2008)  – points out that mistaken precedents seem to change the legal 
content of the relevant statutes in such a way that there is  – necessarily and by 
defi nition  – a diff erence between their communicative content and their legal 
content. 11 He invites us to consider, for example, an appellate decision resulting 
from a court ’ s mistaken identifi cation of statute ’ s communicative content.  ‘ If the 
court ’ s mistake is central to its decision ’, he says,  ‘ that error becomes part of the 
law ’, by which he means that the decision modifi es the legal content of the statute, 
without thereby modifying its communicative content. 12 Consequently, a gap has 
been created between the two types of content. Or so it seems. 
 Second, Smith argues, some statutes specify that other already enacted statutes 
should be interpreted in a particular way  – perhaps in accordance with their reme-
dial purpose or in accordance with human rights  – and thereby seem to change 
the legal content of the relevant pre-existing statutes without any change in their 
communicative content. Victoria ’ s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 
Act, for example, specifi es  – among other things  – that  ‘ [s]o far as it is possible to 
do so consistently with their purpose, all statutory provisions must be interpreted 
in a way that is compatible with human rights ’. 13 In doing so, the Act modifi es the 
contribution that some pre-existing provisions made to the content of the law, 
Smith argues. 14 
 Note that it doesn ’ t seem to make sense to argue that the Act also modifi ed 
the communicative content of the statutes whose legal content was aff ected. How 
could it ? As Smith points out, the Act cannot reasonably be taken to aff ect what the 
legislators intended to communicate by enacting the pre-existing, now modifi ed, 
provisions. And the Act certainly does not constitute new evidence of their original 
communicative intentions. Th us, like mistaken precedents, interpretive provisions 
that aff ect pre-existing legal provisions appear to create a gap between communi-
cative content and legal content, which  – according to the communicative-content 
theory  – should not exist. 
 Th e examples provided by Greenberg, Solum and Smith all put serious pres-
sure on the communicative-content theory of law. To be sure, one could argue 
that the communicative-content theorist might be able to account for the  mens rea 
requirement as contextually implied, since criminal statutes are enacted in a 
context containing information about fi rmly established common law doctrines. 15 
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  16  Consider, eg, the majority ’ s reasoning in  Staples v United States  (Scalia joining) (511 US 600 
( 1994 ) ). In  Staples , the question was whether or not Mr Staples had  – by possessing an unregistered 
machine gun  – violated the National Firearms Act, 26 USC  § 5861(d), which states that  ‘ It shall be 
unlawful for any person  … to receive or possess a fi rearm which is not registered to him in the National 
Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. ’ It was an undisputed fact that Mr Staples  did not know that 
the fi rearm he possessed required registration, due to the fact that the weapon was a semi-automatic 
model inconspicuously modifi ed to operate as an automatic one. 
 Now, the Act does not explicitly contain any requirements regarding the epistemic state of the 
 ‘ possessor ’, and the district court therefore concluded that the Act  did cover Staples ’ s situation and he 
was sentenced to probation and a fi ne; the court of appeals affi  rmed. Th e Supreme Court majority, 
however, argued that the relevant part of the Act had to be construed  ‘ in light of the background rules 
of the common law  … in which the requirement of some  mens rea for a crime is fi rmly embedded ’ 
(511 US 600, 605 (1994)). For Justices Th omas and Scalia, this meant that the communicative content 
of the legislative utterance was something roughly equivalent to the following: it shall be unlawful for 
any person  … to receive or possess a fi rearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms 
 Registration and Transfer Record,  unless the person does not know that the object in question belongs to a 
type of fi rearm that requires such registration . In other words, due crucially to the background assump-
tions shared by the legislature and its intended audience, the actual communicative content of  § 5861(d) 
is a  pragmatic enrichment of its literal content. Or so they argued. 
 Th e problem with this line of reasoning, however, is that if ordinary citizens are generally the 
intended audience of criminal law, then the doctrine of  mens rea cannot reasonably be taken to form 
part of the actual common ground and, consequently, there is no linguistic basis for claiming that the 
communicative content of  § 5861(d) is a corresponding pragmatic enrichment of its literal content. 
Th us, if the Act ’ s legal content includes a  mens rea requirement, as legal practice says it does, then its 
legal content is diff erent from its communicative content. 
But this requires getting rather  – and perhaps unjustifi ably  – creative with the 
resources available to the communicative-content theorist in order to get around 
the problem posed by Greenberg ’ s example. Arguably, for example, a great deal 
of criminal law is addressed to ordinary citizens, who are by no means conver-
sant with legal conventions, however fi rmly established. As a result, knowledge 
of substantive legal doctrines  – such as  mens rea  – on behalf of the audience 
cannot always be assumed, which has signifi cant consequences for this  ‘ contextual 
enrichment ’ strategy. 16 Further, even if this could somehow be made to work, it 
is hard  – if not impossible  – to see how this approach could be used to tackle the 
examples provided by Solum and Smith. 
 In response to Solum ’ s example, one could perhaps argue that it is a mistake 
to take at face value the apparent intuition of legal practitioners that doctrine 
surrounding constitutional provisions  modifi es their legal content. Maybe 
doctrine just  adds content to constitutional law, supplementary to the legal content 
contributed by the relevant provision. Supplementation is rather diff erent from 
modifi cation. Or so the response goes. 
 On this  ‘ supplemental content ’ approach, the communicative content of the 
free speech clause would have to be some kind of general and abstract princi-
ple, which doctrine then  ‘ implements ’ or adds more defi nite content to, rather 
than an unrestricted prohibition. Or else we are stuck with the appearance of 
modifi cation   – ie, of constitutional doctrine limiting the unrestricted scope of 
the free speech clause. Th is approach, then, requires the legal content added by 
constitutional doctrine to be  consistent with the communicative content of the 
First Amendment. 
12 Authority, Communication and Legal Content
  17  See eg Solum (2013b) 22. 
 I think we fi nd the ingredients for something like the supplemental content 
approach in Solum ’ s own work on originalism. As he points out, an  originalist 
might say that while the Supreme Court does not have authority to change the legal 
content of the Constitution, it does  – under certain conditions  – have authority to 
adopt further rules of constitutional law, so long as they are consistent with that 
content. 17 I don ’ t think we are forced, however, to say that these rules become part 
of the legal content of the First Amendment itself, as Solum ’ s example assumes  – it 
seems possible to hold instead that they constitute additional legal content, contrib-
uted by the development of constitutional doctrine. Such content is  associated with 
the First Amendment, to be sure, but  – on the view under consideration  – doctrine 
does not actually contribute to the legal content of the Amendment itself. 
 As we will see, there is some kinship between this response and the Pro 
Tanto view introduced in  section II . However, in contrast to the Pro Tanto view, 
which aspires to off er a unifi ed response to the Gappiness Problem, the scope of 
the originalist response under consideration is signifi cantly limited. Due to the 
consistency constraint, for example, the supplemental approach cannot explain 
away  Greenberg ’ s  mens rea example, since the doctrine is inconsistent with the 
communicative content of criminal statutes whose language does not contain such 
a requirement (functioning, as it does, to limit their scope). Nor does it off er a way 
to handle Smith ’ s examples. 
 I do not pretend to have examined every reasonable response to the  Gappiness 
Problem, but do think it is resistant enough to give us good reason to reject 
identity-based versions of the communicative-content theory. Granted, we might  – 
with some creative eff ort  – be able to explain away some of the apparent gaps 
in one way or another, but no unifi ed or comprehensive strategy seems available 
to proponents of this version of the theory. Th e  ‘ contextual enrichment ’ strategy 
cannot explain away the apparent gap between the communicative content of 
the First Amendment and the legal content of free speech doctrine, just as the 
 ‘ supplemental content ’ strategy cannot explain away the apparent gap between 
the communicative content of criminal statutes whose language does not contain 
a  mens rea requirement and their legal content. And, more importantly, neither 
strategy can at all explain away the apparent gaps created by mistaken precedent 
and interpretive statutes. 
 Th e Gappiness Problem also puts very signifi cant pressure on constitution-
based versions of the communicative-content theory, but a bit more needs to be 
said since constitution  – not being identity  – allows for the constituted entity to 
have properties not shared by the constituting entity, which opens up the possibil-
ity that some such properties explain away the apparent gaps. I will return to this 
issue below ( section III ), but fi rst, let me introduce the Pro Tanto account, which 
highlights nicely  – I think  – the properties that legal content must have in order 
to avoid the Gappiness Problem. Once we have a clearer idea of what is needed 
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  18  See Dancy (2004) 42. 
  19  See eg Pollock and Cruz (1999), Dancy (2004), Schroeder (2011), Horty (2012) and Bader (2016); 
see also, eg, Prakken and Sartor (1996). 
  20  Raz (1972) 831. 
in order to explain away the apparent gaps, we will be in a better position to see 
why the problem also provides a strong case against constitution-based versions 
of theory. 
 II. Th e Pro Tanto View about Legal Content 
 As I have indicated, the Pro Tanto view about legal content is meant to provide 
the ingredients for a principled and unifi ed reply to the Gappiness Problem by 
allowing us to explain away the apparent gaps between the communicative content 
of the relevant statute or constitutional clause and its legal content. Th e key is to 
recognise that legal reasons  – like  ‘ ordinary ’ reasons  – can be defeated by other 
reasons, either by rebutting or undercutting. A reason is subject to rebutting defeat 
if it is outweighed by another confl icting reason  – consider, for example, a scenario 
in which a person ’ s reason not to damage her new shoes is outweighed by a reason 
to help someone in need. Undercutting defeat, on the other hand, occurs when a 
reason is aff ected by another reason in such a way that its weight is reduced, either 
partially or completely  – such as, perhaps, when the weight of a reason to help is 
to some extent reduced by the fact that the person is herself responsible for being 
in trouble. 18 
 I should note that the framework that forms the basis of the proposed account 
is far from novel. Rather, I take it to be a broadly Razian view that relies on an 
independently attractive framework for explaining the nature of reasons generally, 
inspired in part by recent work in epistemology, metaethics, and deontic logic. 19 
 Th e Pro Tanto view is intended as a contribution to the debate concerning the 
appropriate principles of individuation regarding legal content  – ie, how legal obli-
gations, powers, permissions, etc are individuated. Broadly following Raz (1972), 
the idea behind the proposed view is that it is theoretically benefi cial to provide 
what we can call an  ‘ atomistic ’ account of legal content, an account that elucidates 
the contribution that individual laws make to people ’ s legal obligations, powers, 
permissions, etc by  ‘ carving small and manageable units out of the total legal mate-
rial in a way that will promote our understanding of the law by classifying laws 
into various types and by showing how these laws interrelate and interact with one 
another ’. 20 
 Critics of the communicative-content theory, on the other hand, tend to be 
sceptical about the value of such accounts and oft en emphasise what we might 
call the  ‘ holistic ’ appearance of the law. Dworkin (1977), for example, plainly 
says that he pays  ‘ no attention to [the general problem of the individuation of 
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  21  Dworkin (1977) 74, 75 – 76. 
  22  Greenberg (2004) 176. 
  23  ibid, 177. 
  24  ibid, 192. 
  25  For now, I leave it open how best to analyse particular cases. Some cases may be better analysed 
in terms of outweighing, but generally I think it is more promising to analyse the relevant cases in 
laws] ’, indicating that what matters is the normative status of people subject to law 
(ie their obligations, permissions, powers, etc), rather than the way in which their 
status is  ‘ composed ’  – much like the signifi cance of a book lies in the informa-
tion it provides, rather than how the propositions it contains are individuated and 
how they combine to form the content of the book. 21 In a similar vein, Greenberg 
(2004) argues that the  ‘ real ’ problem of legal content is how normative facts make 
certain aspects of legal practice relevant to people ’ s normative status, rather than 
how law practices  ‘ determine the content of the law by contributing propositions 
which then get amalgamated ’. 22  ‘ Th e content of the law ’, he says,  ‘ is not determined 
by any kind of summing procedure, however complicated. ’ 23 And it is a mistake, he 
thinks, to assume that there are  ‘ discrete issues of what considerations are relevant 
to the content of the law and how the relevant considerations combine to deter-
mine the content of the law ’. 24 
 A. Th e Basic Notions, and  ‘ Mechanics ’, of the Pro Tanto View 
 Th e basic idea of the Pro Tanto view is twofold and fundamentally fairly simple. 
(For  ease of exposition, I will restrict the following explication to obligation-
imposing statutes and constitutional clauses.) First, the legal content of an 
obligation-imposing statute or constitutional clause is neither identical with, 
constituted by, nor (merely) supervenes on its communicative content (more on 
constitution, grounding, supervenience in  section III.B below); rather, its enact-
ment grounds a defeasible legal reason to take or refrain from a specifi ed course of 
action (if certain circumstances obtain), a reason that corresponds directly to its 
communicative content. Second, in much the same way that  ‘ ordinary ’  pro tanto 
reasons interact with each other to determine what a person ought all-things-
considered to do, the legal reasons provided by enactment oft en interact with other 
(antecedent or subsequent) legal content to determine the all-things-considered 
legal obligations that people subject to the relevant system have. 
 On the Pro Tanto view, then  – contrary to what most authors seem to assume, 
including critics of the communicative-content theory  – it is not the case that 
the considerations appealed to (precedent, doctrine, presumption, interpretive 
provision, etc)  modify the content that the enactment of a legal provision contrib-
utes to the law (obligations, powers, permissions, etc). Rather, they  interact with 
that content in a certain way, by either undercutting or outweighing the reasons 
provided by it. 25 
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terms of undercutting defeat. It seems clearly odd, for example, to say that Virginia ’ s Racial Integrity 
Act of 1924  – which was deemed unconstitutional  – gave white and non-white citizens a reason not to 
intermarry, while the constitution gave them a reason  against not  – ie,  for  – intermarrying and that the 
constitutional reason outweighed the statutory reason. It seems clearly better to say that, in fact, the 
Equal Protection Clause  undercut the reason provided by the statute in such a way that, in fact, the Act 
carried no genuine weight at all (but that – from a purely legal point of view – it  would have , if it hadn ’ t 
been for the 14th Amendment). 
  26  See eg Fletcher (2000) 812. 
  27  See eg Pollock and Cruz (1999) 37, Dancy (2004) 74 and Horty (2012) 228 – 29. 
  28  See Schroeder (2011) 334 – 35. 
 To fi x these ideas, let us contrast, for example, the Pro Tanto account with 
the view that, unlike excuses and other affi  rmative defences, decisions on justify-
ing circumstances actually modify the  ‘ aff ected ’ rule, by altering the conditions 
under which people count as having committed an off ence. 26 On the  ‘ modifi cation 
view ’, the rule has changed and no longer gives subjects a reason to take or refrain 
from the specifi ed course of action in the circumstances decided upon; the court ’ s 
 decision (that the defendant ’ s actions were justifi ed in the relevant circumstances) 
has therefore altered the relevant statute ’ s legal content, without aff ecting its 
communicative content. In contrast, on the Pro Tanto view the rule still provides 
the same reasons as before, but some of these reasons are now defeated by the 
court ’ s decision. 
 We will get a better sense of the  ‘ mechanics ’ of the Pro Tanto view when 
I explain how the view proposes to tackle the Gappiness Problem. As the exam-
ple above illustrates, however, one of the core ideas behind this account is that a 
defeated reason is still a reason, which allows us to sensibly say that the ( pro tanto ) 
legal content of an  ‘ aff ected ’ statute or constitutional clause remains intact. 
 Th e diff erence between modifi cation and interaction is, of course, far from 
intuitive and it might be tempting to think that, say, decisions on justifying 
circumstances defeat some of the reasons provided by the relevant rule to such 
an extent that they no longer constitute any reasons at all. 27 In that case, the Pro 
Tanto view just collapses into a modifi cation view. Th e usual way to counter this 
line of reasoning  – due to Schroeder (2011)  – involves a scenario in which some-
one ’ s evidential reason is increasingly undermined by an iteration of the defeating 
condition, but we can illustrate the relevant point with an example that is closer 
to home. 28 
 Let ’ s stick with the criminal case in which a court decides on justifying circum-
stances and stipulate that the court in question is a trial court. By hypothesis, the 
decision of the trial court defeats some of the reasons provided by the statute (for 
subjects to take or refrain from the specifi ed course of action, if certain circum-
stances obtain) to such an extent that they constitute no reasons at all. Th e set 
of reasons aff ected by the decision is determined by the scope of the justifying 
circumstances specifi ed by the court. But let ’ s then say that the decision is appealed 
and that the district court of appeal decides to uphold the trial court ’ s judgment. 
As a result of the appellate court ’ s decision, it seems that the statute in question 
now provides even  less reason for subjects to take or refrain from the relevant 
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  29  Another way to illustrate this point in the context of practical reasons is to imagine a scenario 
in which your boss, Al, tells you to  φ , but then his boss, Burt, comes along and tells you to ignore 
Al ’ s orders, only to be followed by Burt ’ s boss, Cecil, who also tells you to ignore Al ’ s orders. Assuming 
that authority is transitive in this case, it seems that although Burt ’ s orders to ignore Al ’ s orders under-
cut the reason you had to  φ (in virtue of Al ’ s having ordered you to), you have even less reason to  φ 
now that Cecil has also ordered you to ignore Al ’ s orders. If that is correct, then some reason must have 
remained aft er Burt ’ s orders to ignore Al ’ s orders, although its weight may have been reduced below 
some threshold of relevance. 
  30  I take the Pro Tanto account to have some distinct advantages over Baude  & Sachs ’ s (2017) account 
of the interaction between statutes and other rules (rules of interpretation). On their view, what I have 
called the  all-things-considered content is attributed to the statute via a direct function from statutes 
and rules of interpretation. But it seems to me that this function is for the most part left  a  ‘ black box ’, 
in which case it merely models rather than explains  – whereas the Pro Tanto account, if successful, 
explains why there is such a function. 
course of action, vis- à -vis the specifi ed circumstances. Th at is, the appellate court ’ s 
decision adds some measure of practical  ‘ oomph ’ to the trial court ’ s decision on 
justifying circumstances, evidenced by the intuition that in deliberating about 
what to do, it is now appropriate for subjects to place more weight on the fact that 
any of the justifying circumstances obtain (if they do). Th is, however, makes sense 
only if  – subsequent to the trial court ’ s decision  – the statute still provides reasons 
whose weight can be (further) reduced by the appellate court ’ s decision, which 
contradicts the hypothesis. 
 We can iterate this scenario with increasing levels of judicial authority (for 
example, state supreme court, federal district court, federal circuit court, and the 
US Supreme Court). I want to be non-committal about what happens at the high-
est level, but at least until a decision has been made at that level, the statute in 
question still provides subjects with  some reason to take or refrain from the speci-
fi ed action in the justifying circumstances specifi ed by the trial court, although 
their weight may have been rendered  ‘ inconsequential ’ already at that level. 29 And 
that is all we need to get the Pro Tanto view going. 
 Th e Pro Tanto view, then, relies crucially on the general idea that  – just as with 
evidential reasons  – many cases in which we are inclined to think that a  practical 
reason has been completely defeated are actually cases of partial undercutting 
defeat. In these cases, the defeated reasons are still reasons, but their weight has 
been reduced below some threshold of relevance. Getting back to the Gappiness 
Problem, the strategy is to apply this line of reasoning to any alleged  ‘ modifi cation ’ 
of legal rules provided by the enactment of a statute or constitutional clause  – 
unless this modifi cation can reasonably be taken to have come about linguistically, 
by way of contextual enrichment. What is going on, according to the Pro Tanto 
view, when the contribution that a statute or constitutional clause makes to the 
body of law does not seem to correspond directly to its communicative content is 
that there is some interaction between it and other legally relevant considerations 
which explains this apparent diff erence. Th us, despite appearances, there is  – on 
this view  – no real gap between the communicative content of the relevant provi-
sion and its legal content. It ’ s just that its  all-things-considered legal  ‘ eff ect ’, if you 
will, depends on the legal content of other legal-normative considerations. 30 
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 B. How the Pro Tanto View Handles the Gappiness Problem 
 Th e Pro Tanto view, then, has a relatively straightforward way to handle the prob-
lems for the communicative-content theory of law raised by Greenberg, Solum 
and Smith. Starting with Greenberg ’ s  mens rea example, and assuming we are 
 talking about cases in which contextual enrichment is an unreasonable stretch, 
the Pro Tanto view takes criminal statutes whose language does not contain a 
 mens rea requirement to actually give offi  cials a reason to apply those statutes 
to cases in which a  ‘ guilty mind ’ is absent; this reason, however, is defeated by 
common law doctrine. Th is analysis may seem to raise issues about the distribu-
tion of the burden of proof in criminal cases involving the relevant statutes, since 
the Pro Tanto view might seem to predict that the absence of  mens rea should 
be treated as an affi  rmative defence, which does not refl ect legal practice. Issues 
about the burden of proof, however, do not and  – I think  – should not depend on 
the metaphysics of legal rules. It does raise issues, though, regarding what weight 
we should give to the intuitions of skilled legal practitioners when we evaluate 
philosophical theories of law. I address this issue further at the end of the present 
discussion. 
 Moving on to Solum ’ s First Amendment example, the issue was that doctrine 
surrounding the First Amendment provides rules concerning prior restraint, 
expression via billboards, and other freedom-of-speech-related notions that 
cannot reasonably be said to be part of the communicative content of the consti-
tutional text. Th is was considered a problem for the communicative-content 
theory because these rules are typically taken to modify the legal content of the 
First Amendment. Either the communicative content of the free speech clause is 
a general and abstract principle, the legal eff ect of which is made more defi nite 
by constitutional doctrine, or  – compounding the problem  – it is entirely unre-
stricted in character, but limited in its legal eff ect by the rules of implementation 
adopted by the Supreme Court. Either way, constitutional doctrine modifi es the 
legal content of the First Amendment without modifying its communicative 
content and, hence, the former is neither identical with nor constituted by the 
latter. 
 Th e supplemental content approach, as we recall from the discussion in the 
previous section, requires the supplemented content to be consistent with the legal 
content provided by the free speech clause, which in turns requires us to take its 
communicative content to be a general and abstract principle, at least insofar as 
the aim is to save the communicative-content theory. (Th is consistency constraint 
was also the source of the limited scope of this approach.) On the Pro Tanto 
view, in contrast, there is no constraint of consistency, and so the communicative 
content of the First Amendment can readily be taken to be unrestricted, in which 
case its legal content is unrestricted, too. Absent other considerations, the First 
Amendment  – on this view  – gives offi  cials a reason not to make  any law abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, including, for example, law restricting expression via 
billboards, and to declare unconstitutional any law that does so. 
18 Authority, Communication and Legal Content
  31  Metromedia, Inc v City of San Diego ,  453 US 490 ( 1981 ) . 
 Th e  ‘ normative landscape ’ may change, however, once other relevant consid-
erations are introduced. Consider, for example, the case of  Metromedia, Inc. 
v  City of San Diego , in which the Supreme Court recognised that  ‘ at times, 
First  Amendment values must yield to other societal interests ’ and ruled that a 
San Diego ordinance substantially limiting the erection of billboards in the inter-
est of traffi  c safety (and city appearance) was not wholly unconstitutional. 31 Once 
issued, the Court ’ s ruling  – on the Pro Tanto view  – defeats some of the reasons 
that offi  cials, in virtue of the First Amendment, previously had. What explains the 
appearance of restricted legal content in the case of the First Amendment  – ie its 
 all-things-considered legal  ‘ eff ect ’  – is the interaction between reasons provided by 
the Constitution and reasons provided by constitutional doctrine. But the latter 
does not  modify the legal content itself; a defeated reason is still a reason. 
 Th e Pro Tanto account off ers a similar solution to the two problems raised 
by Smith. Th e fi rst issue was that mistaken precedents seem to change the legal 
content of the relevant statutes in such a way that there is  – necessarily and by 
defi nition  – a diff erence between their communicative content and their legal 
content. On the Pro Tanto view, however, such precedents do not modify their 
content. An appellate decision, for example, may result from a court ’ s mistaken 
identifi cation of a statute ’ s communicative content and the mistake may indeed 
become part of the law, broadly speaking, but  –  contra Smith  – the error does 
not become part of the statute itself. Accordingly, there is no gap between commu-
nicative content and ( pro tanto ) legal content, although there is, of course, a gap 
between communicative content and  all-things-considered legal eff ect. Th is gap, 
however, is explained by the interaction between reasons provided by the relevant 
provision and the reasons provided by the court ’ s ruling. 
 Th e second issue raised by Smith was that some statutes specify that other 
already enacted statutes should be interpreted in a particular way and thereby seem 
to be able to change the legal content of the relevant pre-existing statutes without 
changing their communicative content (which remains fi xed). On the Pro Tanto 
view, however, provisions like Victoria ’ s Charter of Human Rights and Respon-
sibilities Act do not actually modify the legal content of already enacted statutes 
whose pre-2006 legal contents were not fully consistent with human rights. Rather, 
their legal content remains the same, but some of the reasons they give rise to 
are defeated by reasons provided by the Act. Th e  all-things-considered legal  ‘ eff ect ’ 
of those statutes, then, is diff erent post-2006, but there is no gap between their 
communicative content and their ( pro tanto ) legal content. 
 It is important to (re)emphasise that the Pro Tanto view distinguishes between 
the legal content of a particular statute or constitutional clause  – ie the legal obli-
gations, permissions, powers, etc that they give rise to  – and the legal content 
of the law as a whole  – ie the total set of legal obligations, permissions, powers, 
etc in a particular jurisdiction. Because the content that a particular statute or 
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  32  For a discussion, see Greenberg (2004) 49 ff . 
 constitutional clause contributes to the (body of) law is  pro tanto , it may look, fi rst, 
as if the content of many individual enactments diff ers from their communicative 
content and, second, as if the content of the law as a whole is not just the set of 
legal obligations, permissions, powers, etc contributed by individual legal norms. 
Th is apparent diff erence, however, is explained (away) by the interaction between 
 pro tanto legal content contributed by individual enactments and other legally rele-
vant considerations  – precedent, doctrine, presumption, interpretive provision, 
etc. In this way, the Pro Tanto view purports to explain the  ‘ holistic ’ appearance 
of law, without giving up what is oft en called  atomism : the thesis that  ‘ individual 
legal norms are explanatorily prior to the content of the law as a whole ’. 32 
 Th is, then, is how the Pro Tanto view about legal content proposes to tackle 
the Gappiness Problem. Generally speaking, the problem comes from the fact that 
the intuitions of skilled legal practitioners tell us that it is not uncommon for there 
to be some kind of gap between the communicative content of a statute or consti-
tutional clause and its legal content, the most manifest of which are perhaps the 
gaps that seem to be created by subsequent modifi cation of legal content. On the 
assumption that these intuitions are reliable indicators of the relationship between 
the two types of content, this gives us the ingredients for the following general 
argument against the communicative-content theory: 
 P.1  If  – either necessarily or actually  – the legal content of a (valid) statute or 
constitutional clause directly corresponds to its communicative content (via 
identity, constitution, grounding, or supervenience), then there cannot be a 
change in the legal content of a (valid) statute or constitutional clause without 
a change in its communicative content. 
 P.2  Th ere can be a change in the legal content of a (valid) statute or constitu-
tional clause without a change in its communicative content. 
 C.  It is not the case  – either necessarily or actually  – that the legal content of 
a (valid) statute or constitutional directly corresponds to its communicative 
content. 
 Th e conclusion, of course, is that the communicative-content theory of law is false, 
in whatever version. 
 Th e Pro Tanto view allows us to resist P2 by holding that legal content provides 
(or consists in)  pro tanto reasons for action, subject to possible defeat by other 
legal considerations, either by undercutting or outweighing. I say  ‘ resist ’, because 
in order to demonstrate the falsity of P2, we will  – depending on the modality 
involved  – have to positively establish the impossibility of a change in the legal 
content of a statute or constitutional clause without a change in its communica-
tive content, either  tout court or within the set of possible worlds  ‘ like ours ’. Both 
are tall orders, each with their own challenges. However, what the Pro Tanto view 
does manage to show is that none of the problems described in section I suffi  ces to 
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  35  See Raz (1986) 53. 
establish P2. In section III, I hope to put further pressure on P2, by showing how 
the Pro Tanto view links up fairly naturally with certain familiar claims about the 
foundation of authority. 
 Before moving on, though, I should acknowledge that the Pro Tanto view does 
require that we give up the claim that the actual practice of skilled practitioners is 
good evidence of the relation between the communicative content of an individual 
statute or constitutional clause and its legal content, which is arguably a signifi cant 
cost. However, it does not require us to hold that the intuitions of skilled legal 
practitioners are wholly unreliable or irrelevant. Just as competent speakers of 
language have reliable intuitions about the content communicated via an utterance 
without having reliable intuitions about the exact semantic content of the words 
used and the details of how semantic content is aff ected by context to produce the 
content communicated, 33 skilled legal practitioners may well have reliable intui-
tions about the  all-things-considered legal-normative  ‘ status ’ of persons (ie their 
 all-things-considered legal obligations, powers, permissions, etc) without having 
reliable intuitions about the exact normative content of the relevant legal consid-
erations and the details of how that content interacts to produce that status. As 
a result, I do not think it counts against the Pro Tanto account that it does not 
respect the intuition of skilled legal practitioners that the legal content of the 
relevant provision gets modifi ed in the cases discussed. 
 III. Authority, Communication and Legal Content 
 Having introduced the Pro Tanto view, it is time  – as promised  – to connect the 
view to a theory of authority and a principled account of how legal content is 
individuated. As a matter of general jurisprudence, the most fundamental claim 
on which the view relies is that it is among the essential functions of law to help 
subjects better comply with the reasons that apply to them and that the means by 
which law does so is by expressing views about how its subject ought to behave. 34 
Th is mediation between subjects and reasons, of course, is the backbone of Raz ’ s 
(1986) service conception of authority. 35 In what follows, I adopt a great deal 
of the service conception, but I do not want to commit myself to the claim that 
this is law ’ s only essential function. If I ’ m right in what I say, the more modest 
claim is all I need to motivate the link between authority and the Pro Tanto view. 
 As a starting point, Raz invites us to consider the fact that, necessarily, the 
law claims legitimate authority, and that the normal way to justify authority is to 
claim that accepting the authority ’ s directives as binding gives one a better shot at 
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  36  In formulating the service conception, Raz uses the term  ‘ directive ’ in a broad sense, to include 
 ‘ propositions, norms, rules, standards, principles, doctrines, and the like ’, rather than to refer only to 
the content of a directive speech-act; see Raz (1985) 303. 
  37  Raz (1985), 303. 
  38  Such directives, therefore, are (at least qualifi ed) peremptory reasons. Here, I follow Shapiro (2002), 
 contra Raz, in holding that deliberation is properly normative (ie it involves action-guidance) and that 
pre-emptive reasons and peremptory reasons are normatively equivalent, if not ontologically so. 
  39  Raz (1985), 299. Note that I have changed the order of the theses so that the pre-emption thesis 
occurs before the normal justifi cation thesis. 
doing the right thing (relative not just to a one-off  instance but to a domain 
of action). 36 On the assumption that it is possible to justify legal authority this 
way, the law must be of a certain kind, Raz says: it must be the kind of thing the 
directives of which, fi rst, are (or are presented as being)  ‘ someone ’ s view of how 
its subjects ought to behave ’ and, second, can be identifi ed  ‘ without relying on 
reasons  … on which the [directives purport] to adjudicate ’. 37 
 Th ese two features each refl ect the mediating role of authority, on Raz ’ s 
account. Authorities issue directives that refl ect a view  – typically theirs  – on 
how subjects ought to behave, a view they have come to, if they operate as they 
should, aft er considering the reasons that apply to their subjects independently 
of the involvement of the associated authoritative pronouncement. Raz calls such 
reasons  dependent reasons . Th e authorities ’ directives, however, are not simply to 
be added to the balance of reasons, as suggestions or advice would be  – rather, 
they should replace some of the reasons on which they depend. Th us, authorita-
tive directives are reasons that preempt dependent reasons and the deliberation 
on the merit of performing the action prescribed (at least vis- à -vis the relevant 
dependent reasons). 38 
 Raz ’ s classic summary of the service conception consists in the following trio 
of theses: 39 
 Th e dependence thesis : All authoritative directives should be based, among 
other factors, on reasons which apply to the subjects of those directives  … 
 Th e pre-emption thesis : Th e fact that an authority requires performance of an 
action is a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all other 
relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should replace some of them. 
 Th e normal justifi cation thesis : Th e normal and primary way to establish that a 
person should be acknowledged to have authority over another person involves 
showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which 
apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the 
directives of the authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, 
than if he tries to follow the reasons which apply to him directly. 
 It is important to add to this that not only are authoritative reasons preemptive, 
they are also  exclusionary . Exclusionary reasons are negative second-order reasons, 
in the sense that they are not simply reasons to act in a certain way, but reasons 
not to act on reasons to act in a certain way. Th us, authoritative directives are both 
22 Authority, Communication and Legal Content
  40  See Raz (1979/2002), 17–18. 
  41  Note that the views in question do not have to be presented as authoritative in order to serve their 
role  – it is enough that the  ‘ recipient ’ treat the expressed view as binding. 
  42  See Alexander (2010), 142 ff . 
  43  Note that an authority can serve its function even if it never issues a directive  – so long as its subject 
treat the authorities expression as a directive, the normal justifi cation thesis is satisfi ed. 
positive, preemptive fi rst-order reasons (reasons for, say,  φ -ing, which replace the 
positive dependent reasons) and negative second-order reasons (reasons, then, not 
to act on certain reasons not to  φ ). Raz calls such composite reasons  protected 
reasons . 40 
 Of special interest to us here is the service conception ’ s corollary thesis that 
if it is among the essential functions of law to help subjects better comply with 
the reasons that apply to them, then  – assuming that law is authoritative, rather 
than, for example, manipulative or educative  – the law must be the kind of thing 
the directives of which are, or are presented as being, someone ’ s view of how its 
subjects ought to behave. For the purposes of the Pro Tanto account, this thesis 
captures much of what I am aft er, but although I generally embrace Raz ’ s concep-
tion of legitimate authority and its application to the legal domain, I ’ d like to move 
through some of the steps in a slightly diff erent way, just to be able to make it 
transparent enough how I view the Pro Tanto account ’ s relation to the service 
conception. 
 It is worth noting, fi rst, that on the service conception, it is possible for A to 
have authority over B without A expressing a view of how B ought to behave. Such 
expression is needed only in order for A to  serve B as an authority. And even so, 
A can express a view of how B ought to behave in many ways  – some of them 
linguistic, some not. We probably all know the evil eye, for example  – or an open 
palm pointed towards a dinner-ready table. 41 Heck, A could even telepathically 
express a view about how B ought to behave, to put an example from Alexander 
(2010) to my own use; 42 so long as B accepts the telepathed content as binding, 
A  can serve her mediating role. For my purposes here, it is therefore useful to 
slightly rephrase the above corollary, to make it fully clear that linguistic commu-
nication is not part of the story yet (and to highlight that I don ’ t want to insist 
here on analysing the relevant expression as a directive speech act, although this 
is indeed the analysis I favour 43 ): if it is among the essential functions of law to 
help subjects better comply with the reasons that apply to them (via its role as 
an authority), then law can serve this function only if it is capable of expressing 
a view about how its subjects ought to behave. 
 A. Legally Authoritative Expression and the Semantics 
of Legal Statements 
 Now, although  – on the account proposed here  – law ’ s expression is (in a sense) 
a given, the same of course does not apply to which forms of expression count, 
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and whose. Th is is contingently determined by law itself, which is to say that the 
rules of recognition at the foundation of any given legal system determine, among 
other things, who is authorised to express views about how the law ’ s subjects 
ought to behave, and what form such expression must take. In other words, 
the constitutive rules of the relevant system determine what counts as the  law ’ s 
expression. 
 Typically, of course, the law expresses views about how its subjects ought to 
behave in a variety of ways  – most prominently via legislation and judge-made 
law (coupled, in some systems, with administrative agency lawmaking). And 
some judge-made law happens not via precedent but via custom; the law need not 
express itself view via a single expressive act  – the view in question may emerge 
gradually over time, in virtue of any number of relevant acts. (Generally, I take 
judges to make law  – as a matter of fact  – even in strict civil law systems, although 
the process through which their decisions make law is perhaps signifi cantly more 
 ‘ recalcitrant ’ than in common law systems.) 
 I will return to the crucial issue of which forms of expression count, and 
whose, but for the time being what matters is that irrespective of particular modes 
of expression, in expressing a view about how its subjects ought to behave, the 
law presents a perspective from which its subjects genuinely have the specifi ed 
 obligations, powers, permissions, etc. 
 It may seem natural to take this to have specifi c implications for the seman-
tic analysis of legal statements  – most notably, perhaps, that it implies that when 
we use  ‘ ought ’ in legal statements it means the same as it does when we use it 
in moral statements, ie that the meaning of the legal  ‘ ought ’ is in some relevant 
sense  ‘ moralised ’. Th is, indeed, is Raz ’ s view  – when speakers utter legal statements 
in what he calls a  detached fashion, the meaning of the statement is that, from 
the perspective of the law, the subject in question has a moral obligation, power, 
permission, etc. 
 Shapiro (2006) has further argued that, using Raz ’ s analysis, we can make 
good sense of what we can call  ‘ pure ’ legal reasons. He points out that on one 
reading, the modifi er  ‘ legal ’ functions as an adjective, on the other, as a  qualifi er. 
On the adjectival reading, a legal reason to  φ is a genuine moral reason to  φ , 
the existence of which depends on the operations of legal institutions (suitably 
understood). A genuine reason here is just a fact or consideration that in fact 
counts in favour of some action. On the qualifi ed reading, however, one has a 
legal reason to  φ   – roughly  – just in case, from the perspective of the law, one has 
a genuine moral reason to  φ (at least partly in virtue of the law having directed 
one to  φ ). 
 While I think the moralised perspectival analysis does captures an important 
truth about (the pragmatics of) authoritative expression, I do not think it furnishes 
the semantics of legal statements. As Wodak (2018) points out, as a proposal about 
the semantics of such statements, not only does it run up against what  – for good 
reason  – has become the orthodox view in linguistics about the meaning of  ‘ ought ’ 
and other modal expressions (due largely to Angelika Kratzer ’ s infl uential David 
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  44  See, in particular, Kratzer (1981) and (1991). 
  45  See Wodak (2018) 800 ff . 
Lewis-inspired work 44 ), it also suff ers from certain intractable problems related 
to the  ‘ stacking ’ of modifi ers, ie sentence constructions where modifi ers embed 
under other modifi ers. 
 Wodak ’ s primary example is how the suggested account fails to provide a prin-
cipled account of how, intuitively,  ‘ legal ’ stacks with  ‘ moral ’, as for example in the 
sentence  ‘A has a legal moral reason to  φ ’. 45 First, as Wodak points out, the stack-
ing of the modifi ers should clarify  ‘ what the legal point of view is about ’, in a way 
that is analogous to eff ects of stacking  ‘ Kantian ’ and  ‘ moral ’ in, say, the sentence 
 ‘A has a Kantian obligation to  φ ’. But while such a clarifi cation comes intuitively in 
the latter case, the same does not go for the former; the sentence seems linguisti-
cally anomalous, as it ’ s called. Another way to highlight the issue here might be to 
say that whereas moving between the sentences  ‘ From the perspective of Kantian 
theory, A has a moral reason to  φ ’ and  ‘A has a Kantian reason to  φ ’ is intuitive, the 
same does not go for  ‘ From the perspective of the law, A has moral reason to  φ ’ 
and  ‘A has a legal reason to  φ ’, which spells trouble for the moralised perspectival 
analysis. 
 Proponents of the moralised analysis might respond by claiming that stack-
ing modifi ers this way for some reason forces an adjectival  – rather than a 
 perspectival  – interpretation, ie an interpretation on which  ‘ legal ’ marks the source 
of the moral reason. But, in addition to absence of a principled explanation for 
this, we also seem forced, then, to conclude that the following sentence is semanti-
cally (and thus necessarily) inconsistent:  ‘A has a legal moral reason to  φ but does 
not have a moral reason to  φ ’. A proponent of the perspectival account, however, 
should presumably want to be able to interpret this perspectivally, and to yield a 
truth in some circumstances. It seems, then, that the moralised view needs to posit 
some very convoluted, ad hoc rules governing the use of the modifi er  ‘ legal ’, in 
particular regarding the relationship both between single and stacked occurrences 
of it and between  ‘ legal ’ and  ‘ moral ’, as types of modifi ers. 
 Th e Raz/Shapiro view no doubt captures an insight about the use of legal-
normative language, but it does not seem to capture its semantics, then. Th e 
orthodox view, in contrast, does  – I think. As a general account of the semantics 
of modal expressions, Kratzer ’ s view is motivated both by the attractiveness of a 
unifi ed account of such expressions (like  ‘ ought ’,  ‘ must ’ and  ‘ may ’ )  – given that 
their use exhibits a distinct feeling of invariance, not just in English but across 
languages  – and by worries associated with positing indefi nite polysemy (due to 
the vast variety of uses to which such expressions can be put). On Kratzer ’ s view, 
the meaning of modal expressions is the same across diff erent uses but specifi c 
uses of the term get their diff erent  ‘ fl avours ’ due to the diff erent contexts in which 
they are used. Th is contextual variance is complex, yet systematic  – in technical 
parlance,  ‘ ought ’ has two parameters, which get specifi ed contextually and the 
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  48  I should note that I make what is called the  Limit Assumption  – colloquially, that there is always a 
unique set of worlds closest to the relevant ideal (and thus the set of possible worlds to be considered 
has to be  fi nite ); see Lewis (1973). Th e Limit Assumption is controversial, but I think it is plausible in 
the legal domain; in any case, nothing really hangs on it, so it is safe to assume for the sake of (relative) 
simplicity. 
interaction of which determines the relevant modal  ‘ fl avour’, and with it deter-
mines the truth-conditions of the statement in question. 
 Th e truth of claims in which modals occur is doubly relative, then; fi rst, to 
what is referred to as the expression ’ s  modal base and, second, to what is referred 
to as its  ordering source . Kratzer calls these the expression ’ s  conversational back-
grounds , which come in diff erent kinds. Backgrounds that provide a modal base 
are what she calls  realistic  – they can be  epistemic or  circumstantial , or possibly 
 empty . Semi-formally, realistic backgrounds are functions that in  w assign sets 
of worlds that are true in  w . Backgrounds that provide an ordering source are 
 normative ; these can be  deontic ,  stereotypical ,  teleological or  buletic . Normative 
backgrounds impose an ordering on the set assigned by the conversational back-
ground fi xing the modal base, ie, they are functions that yield an  ideal represented 
by the set of  propositions  A which induces a partial ordering on the set of worlds 
provided by the modal base. 
 On this account, necessity (for our purposes, obligation) plays out in the 
following way, roughly: A proposition  p is a necessity iff   p is true in all acces-
sible worlds that come closest to the ideal introduced by the ordering source. 46 
And possibility (for our purposes, permissibility), in turn, is defi ned in terms of 
the absence of necessity (for the negation). 47 Importantly, Kratzer ’ s doubly relative 
account is also designed to capture graded modality, but we can leave that aside 
for our purposes here. 48 
 Now, applied to legal statements, the modal base will be empty. Th is just means 
that  all possible worlds are accessible from  w . Th e ordering source will be deon-
tic: namely,  what the law provides . Th e ordering source, then, orders all possible 
worlds with respect to how close they come to what the law provides. Semanti-
cally, therefore, saying that, legally, S must  φ is to say that in all possible worlds 
that come closest to the ideal introduced by the law, S  φ s. And saying that, legally, 
S may  φ is to say that it is not the case that in all possible worlds that come clos-
est to the ideal introduced by the law, S does not  φ (ie, that in at least one such 
world, S  φ s). 
 On the view proposed here, the orthodox view about the semantics of modal 
expressions captures the meaning of legal-normative statements, while the Raz/
Shapiro analysis captures a crucial part of what grounds the content of the law, ie, 
of the pragmatics of authoritative expression. On the assumption that grounding 
involves metaphysical necessitation, it may oft en be quite unproblematic to use 
these analyses interchangeably, especially if the relevant determination relation 
entails supervenience (either generally or coupled with domain-specifi c claims 
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  50  If what I have said is correct, it follows that Coleman ’ s (2007)  moral semantics thesis contains an 
important insight, even though it is not strictly correct:  ‘ [T]he content of the law can be truthfully 
 redescribed as expressing a moral directive or authorization; ’ p 592. 
about how the relevant underlying facts ground legal content). 49 As a matter of 
theorising, however, it pays off  to take them to be compatible analyses of diff er-
ent, albeit intimately related, phenomena (rather than competing views about the 
semantics of legal statements). 50 
 B. Law ’ s Expression and the Metaphysics of Legal Content 
 How does the law ’ s expression, then, create legal content ? As I mentioned above, 
I will have to say something about particular modes of expression in order to 
properly ground the communicative-content thesis, but for now it will pay off  to 
continue to approach things in a simplifi ed way. What matters for our immedi-
ate purposes is just that the law ’ s expression creates an  ideal (or a constellation 
thereof), which now applies to its subjects.  Prima facie , this may sound onto-
logically innocent, but, as I will try to make as transparent as possible below, 
I  take such ideals to be a part of reality and, further, to be signifi cantly distinct 
from the speech acts that create them, something akin to a fi ctional normative 
entity (although not fi ction, per se). Th e individuation of legal content, there-
fore, is derivative of the individuation of law ’ s expression, on this account. As a 
matter of labelling, the general terms  ‘ legal content ’ and  ‘ the content of the law ’ 
refer, on my account, to the set of these artifactual entities, instances of which 
are  ‘ purely ’ legal obligations, powers, permissions, etc (or constellations thereof). 
Hopefully, it will become clear how this is not merely a matter of  stipulative 
 labelling  – these entities defi nitely earn their label, I think. 
 It is important to note that the creation here is not causal, but one of meta-
physical determination  – (purely) legal content  exists in virtue of the law ’ s 
expression. And the account of legal content presented here is non-eliminative, 
since I take legal content to be something  ‘ over and above ’ its underlying facts, in 
a sense to be made clearer below. It will be a little harder to tell with confi dence 
whether or not the account is reductive, in part because it depends on what we 
take reduction to be. 
 One might of course have doubts either, generally, about the existence of arti-
facts or, specifi cally, about the existence of legal content. As a matter of what kind 
of stuff  there is in the world, is there any reason to count legal content among it, 
rather than just the underlying speech act ? Th e answer here, I think, comes from 
considering the extent to which the legal content, as an artifact, has any signifi -
cant properties which the fundamental facts do not. Th ere is a range of relevant 
properties that suffi  ce to distinguish legal content as  ‘ new stuff  ’, distinct from the 
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  53  See, in particular, Hershovitz (2015) and Waldron (2013). Some put Greenberg (2014) in the same 
camp, but I think his view is signifi cantly more radical than this. 
underlying facts, I believe. Some of these are familiar temporal and modal diff er-
ences and some are more peculiar to legal content, as such. Here are a few of the 
most prominent ones (for ease of exposition, I focus here only on obligations). 
 Unlike its underlying set of facts, a (purely) legal obligation is something which: 
•  endures beyond the existence of the relevant expression; 
•  is temporal but not spatial (albeit jurisdictional); 
•  can be created and repealed (ie made to exist and made not to exist); 
•  can be had by those subject to it (which is diff erent from having a moral status 
from the perspective of the law); 
•  can be violated (or conformed to) by those subject to it. 
 In addition to giving us good reasons to think that legal content really exists, these 
(and numerous other) properties should also make us doubt that the relevant 
determination relation between the underlying speech act and the resulting legal 
content is that of constitution. Constitution, not being identity, of course allows 
for ways in which the constituted entity comes apart from its constituting facts, 
but it is reasonable to take the relation to still require a pretty strict sharing of 
 properties. 51 A statue and the lump of clay constituting it have the same shape, 
weight, smell, and so forth, for example. I don ’ t think we see such overlap in the 
case of the law ’ s expression and legal content, in which case we need to appeal to 
some other, less  ‘ tight ’ metaphysical relation in explaining the relation between the 
two sets of facts. Grounding, I think, has the best prospect of doing the relevant 
explanatory work. It ’ s certainly not anything like the determinable/determinate 
relation, mereological parthood, functional realisation, type or token identity, etc, 
all of which are (for our purposes here) comparably tight to constitution  – and 
supervenience, as I have indicated, is not a  ‘ deep ’ explanatory relation, although 
it may of course play a role in the overall explanation of the nature of the relevant 
set of facts. 
 Now, even if legal content is real and signifi cantly distinct from its underly-
ing facts, nothing said so far excludes the possibility that it is  epiphenomenal  – ie, 
that it is metaphysically determined but does not itself metaphysically determine 
anything else (with some trivial exceptions 52 ). To me, this is both one of the most 
vexing questions of general jurisprudence and one of the more signifi cant ones, 
especially given recent arguments to the eff ect that even if there is such a thing as 
 ‘ pure ’ legal content, there is no reason for us to appeal to it in theorising about law. 53 
For any question that matters, the thought goes, we can instead appeal directly to 
the underlying facts, irrespective of which jurisprudential theory we hold. 
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grounding facts. Plausibly, legal validity is not a property of anything in the grounding base. 
 To get some traction about how we might properly answer this question, we 
should consider, I think, whether  – when related to legal content via grounding  – 
the underlying set of facts (or some subset thereof) has any properties it would 
otherwise lack. 54 It seems to me that this is indeed the case, at least on the view 
proposed here. Th ose who propose to demote the notion of legal content oft en 
say that what we should be paying attention to is just the (genuine/real/robust) 
normative weight of the underlying facts, but it seems to me that, partly, the 
underlying facts have such weight  – and/or have the particular weight that they 
have  – in virtue of the fact that they ground legal content. If that is the case, then 
not only is legal content real, it is also  ‘ metaphysically effi  cacious ’ and explanatorily 
indispensable. 
 Another way to frame this argument is to say that under certain conditions, 
authority becomes institutionalised and with that come criteria of legal validity. 
Only if expressed in the right way  – as determined by the constitutive rules of the 
institution  – does the grounding relation obtain and legal content come into being. 
Legal obligations, permissions, powers, etc, then, have a particular kind of insti-
tutional status, and they do so  essentially/non-derivatively . 55 Th is way of putting 
things may allow us to state the response to the defl ationist about legal content 
even more forcefully. If part of the explanation for why we should pay attention to 
the underlying facts is that the entities that these facts metaphysically determine 
have a certain property as a matter of essence, then, surely, those entities  – and in 
particular that property  – should have a clear place in our theorising about law. 
Th is may not be true of every theory of law, but it certainly seems to apply on 
the view presented here, which is enough to rebut the claim that  – as a general 
matter  –  ‘ pure ’ legal content is a dispensable ontological category. 
 Th at said, what exactly  is pure legal content, such that it is (supposed to be) 
real, distinct from its underlying facts, and not epiphenomenal ? Fundamentally, of 
course, the law  – when it exists  – creates the equivalent of a Kratzer-style ordering 
source (see  section III.A ), simply in virtue of being a unifi ed, normative system 
(partly in virtue of the fact that one of its essential functions is to help subjects 
better comply with the reasons that apply to them). It is in virtue of the exist-
ence of a legal system  – as such  – that we get an ordering on possible worlds at 
all. Th e law, we can say, is in the business of constructing ideals. Specifi c legal 
content then determines what the ordering is in fact like. Accordingly, individual 
contents  – ie  legal obligations, powers, permissions, etc  – are best character-
ised, I submit,  by the way their creation aff ects the relevant ordering (an ordering 
specifi c to a particular system/jurisdiction). 
 As I have indicated above, in proposing the Pro Tanto view as a response to 
the Gappiness Problem, I think that the interaction that determines the  all-things-
considered contours of the overall legal content of a given system is oft en fairly 
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mined by the eff ect it has on the ordering of worlds  all-things-considered . Whereas I have argued that it 
is in fact determined by the way it interacts  – or does not interact  – with already existing legal content 
to aff ect this ordering. 
complex  – it is, indeed as Greenberg thinks, certainly nothing like an additive 
function, however complex. But it is still,  contra Greenberg, an amalgamation of 
atomic entities. Focusing again just on obligations, some cases are pretty straight-
forward, such as when an expression with the content  that (in C) S must  φ changes 
the ordering of possible worlds so that, now, in all accessible worlds that come clos-
est to the ideal introduced by the ordering source, S  φ s (whereas before this was 
not the case). In this case, the obligation to  φ is wholly undefeated. In other cases, 
things are more intricate. Consider again, for example, the case in which common 
law doctrine  ‘ adds ’ a  mens rea requirement to a criminal off ence. Here, an expres-
sion the content of which is a criminal statute, but the language of which does 
not contain a  mens rea requirement, will create an interaction with the  mens rea 
doctrine in such a way that, now, in all accessible worlds that come closest to the 
ideal introduced by the ordering source, no one acts in the specifi ed way with 
whatever  mens rea is taken to be relevant. In this case, the obligation contributed 
by the speech act is partly defeated, but  – as a matter of individuation  – the obliga-
tion itself is still determined by how it  would aff ect the ordering, had it not been 
defeated. 56 
 Before moving on, I want to return briefl y to some of the properties I said 
that legal content has, or can have. It may seem entirely mysterious, for example, 
how people subject to the law can  have , let alone  violate , the sort of entity I have 
described. Perhaps I am making a category mistake of some sort ? I don ’ t think 
I am. To  have something can mean a variety of things  – I can have a headache, a 
reason, a sister, a cold, etc  – but what is common to all these uses of the locution 
is some relevant sort of relation. In the case of obligations, generally, I think it is 
plausible to say that they relate agents and action-types in a certain way (or agents 
and propositions of which action-types are constituents). One  has an obligation 
simply when one stands in that relation. And on the account of legal content I have 
just characterised, people subject to the law certainly stand in a relevant relation 
to action-types, I think. For one to have a (purely) legal obligation to  φ , on this 
account, is for one to be related to  φ -ing in a certain way  – namely, to be an indi-
vidual such that in all accessible worlds that come closest to the ideal provided by 
the relevant jurisdiction, one  φ s. Another way to describe this relation  – not too 
convoluted, I hope  – is perhaps to say that for one to have a legal obligation is for 
one to be related to the relevant action-type(s) in virtue of being related to the 
ordering source, which orders the possible worlds in such a way that in all the best 
worlds, one instantiates the type. 
 It is worth pointing out that the account presented here is not, I think, 
subject to what Greenberg (2004) calls the  rational-relation constraint, ie that the 
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underlying facts make intelligible or rationally explain that the legal facts obtain. 57 
It seems to me that  –  contra Greenberg  – this is a constraint which, if applicable, is 
applicable not to the relation between pure legal facts and their determinants but 
that between pure legal facts and robust normative facts. But even if it were appli-
cable to the former, it would in fact be satisfi ed, I think, both in terms of how legal 
content is determined by the underlying speech acts and in terms of what makes 
this the case (the interplay between necessary facts about authority and contingent 
facts about rules of recognition). To use Greenberg ’ s own example, there is  – on 
the proposed account  – indeed a (I should add  ‘ transparent ’ )  ‘ reason that delet-
ing a particular word from a statutory text [has] the impact on the law that it  … 
in fact [has] ’. 58 
 So far, so good (I hope). It might still be thought, however, that I have made a 
category mistake. Even if legal obligations can be  modelled by the orthodox modal 
semantics, isn ’ t it taking the machinery too far to say that such semantics in some 
relevant sense determine what they are ? Not necessarily, I think  – and here the 
law ’ s similarity to fi ction becomes salient. In the case of genuine moral obligations, 
I do take the semantics to merely model reality, but in the case of the law, as I have 
said, we are in the business of constructing ideals (ordering sources). While not 
fi ction, as such, the way in which the law creates these ideals is much like fi ction, 
in the sense that  ‘ saying so makes it so ’. By expressing a view about how its subjects 
ought to behave, such as  ‘ In C, S ought to  φ , ’ the law creates an ideal  – in C, S  φ s  – 
which gets added to the existing body of ideals and interacts with it in more or less 
complicated ways. Since the ideal corresponds directly to the content of the view 
expressed, we have an explanation for why the legal content of an individual law 
corresponds directly to the content of the relevant expression, even if  – taken as a 
whole  – the content of the law has a rather  ‘ holistic ’ appearance. 
 I should acknowledge that, as stated, the Kratzer semantics doesn ’ t by itself 
capture the way in which the various (pro tanto) legal contents interact to deter-
mine the  all-things-considered way in which they aff ect the overall ordering. Worse 
yet, it may seem like the machinery actually makes impossible the scenarios that I ’ m 
trying to capture. In the standard semantics, confl icting ideals are typically taken 
simply to be  ‘ tied ’ and so, for example, in the  mens rea scenario, the  semantics  – 
unamended  – could be taken to yield the verdict that it is  indeterminate whether 
someone who did what the criminal statute prohibited but without the  mens rea 
(required by the common law doctrine) has violated their legal obligation. 
 Th e inability to capture diff erent weights within the ordering source, and their 
interaction, has long seemed to be one of the stickier problems of the orthodox 
view. 59 As a response, a number of promising suggestions have recently been 
made about how best to extend the standard framework to capture this. Some, like 
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Goble (2013), propose that we add a weight parameter to the propositions in the 
ordering source, while others, like Silk (2017), propose instead that we make them 
dependent on the absence of defeating conditions, while yet others, like Katz et al 
(2012), propose that we combine ( ‘ merge ’ ) any relevant ordering sources in a 
way that represents their priority relations. Of the three, I think the latter two are 
particularly attractive, especially Silk ’ s, due to its simplicity. I suspect, however, 
that such extensions may not be necessary, so long as we can appropriately dele-
gate some of the linguistic work to pragmatics. Uttering the sentence  ‘ S must  φ ’ 
on its own, the content conveyed may of course be  – and perhaps even normally 
so  – that given  everything that the law says, S must  φ . As a matter of pragmat-
ics, it is also generally inferable in such situations that the speaker believes (and 
intends to communicate)  – the force of the obligation to be  all-things-considered . 
But modal language is fl exible and sometimes  – in particular when confl icting 
obligations are present  – the content conveyed may be that given  some of what the 
law says, S must  φ . In such cases, the pragmatic implication is defeated and the 
appropriate inference regarding the force of the claimed obligation would be that 
it is  pro tanto . 
 Th e following example illustrates fairly well the mechanics I have in mind. Say 
that S utters  ‘ You ought to help your friend fi x their fence ’. Without further context, 
the warranted inference here is that the speaker believes and intends to communi-
cate that given  all the relevant considerations regarding the value of friendship, you 
 all-things-considered ought to help your friend (pragmatic aspects of the content 
italicised). However, if S subsequently utters  ‘ But you also ought to help your other 
friend move to their new fl at ’, this cancels both pragmatic inferences; now, the 
appropriate inference with respect to both statements is that given  some of the 
relevant considerations regarding the value of friendship, you  pro tanto ought to 
help your friend fi x their fence/move to their new fl at. Moreover, no information 
is conveyed here about the relative weights of the two competing obligations. Th is 
may be added explicitly  – such as by complementing the two statements by saying 
 ‘ It ’ s more important to help your friend move, so that ’ s what you ought to do ’, 
possibly (and perhaps normally) triggering an inference that the content intended 
to be conveyed pertains to an  all-things-considered obligation  – or information 
about relative weights may be part of the conversational background. 60 Of course, 
in ordinary conversation, a speaker is most likely to utter two confl icting modal 
statements in contexts in which it is unlikely that a resolution is to be had (either 
epistemically or metaphysically). In theoretical analyses, however, things are quite 
diff erent, so we need an account of what licenses the above inference, even if such 
an argument is unlikely to be made in ordinary settings. Th e outlined picture does 
a reasonably good job accommodating both types of scenarios, I submit. 
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 ‘ non-monotonically ’, I take this point also to apply in the case of metaethics. 
 Th is has obviously been a very rough sketch of the approach I prefer. I cannot 
expand on it here, but should note that what  – in large part  – motivates this 
pragmatics-heavy approach is that I think that adding a mechanism for captur-
ing the way in which  pro tanto norms interact (intra- or intersystematically) to 
produce the ultimate ranking is simply asking too much of semantics  – it seems 
both unnecessary and to give rise to worries about unrealistic demands in terms 
of semantic competence (a worry some have already marshalled against the 
unamended Kratzer semantics 61 ). How normatively relevant considerations 
combine  – whether in the case of preferences, expected utility, morality, or law, 
etc  – is a matter of how things are in the world. Such facts of course still play a 
very signifi cant role in inferring and evaluating the content conveyed by the use 
of modal language, but not in virtue of actually being represented in the semantic 
content of modal statements. In any case, for our purposes here, I will make do 
with the standard semantics, as they are. 
 As a last matter in this rather extensive sub-section, I ’ d like to revisit briefl y 
the relationship not between law ’ s expression and legal content, but between the 
content expressed and the content of the law. Given the extremely close relation-
ship that I take to obtain between the two types of content, it may be natural to 
wonder whether in eff ect I ’ m taking the (propositional) content of law ’ s expression 
to  constitute the associated legal content. Th e Gappiness Problem of course puts 
signifi cant pressure on constitution-based views of the communicative-content 
theory, but I should acknowledge that I do not think I have a conclusive argument 
against them. 
 We  can conclusively rule out the identity view, I think, because it doesn ’ t have 
the resources to explain how legal content interacts so as to explain the apparent 
gaps. On diff erent grounds, we can also rule out the mere-supervenience view. 
Supervenience, as I have indicated, is not a deep explanatory relation; 62 the rela-
tion is also too coarse-grained for our purposes here, focusing, as it does, on types 
of facts (or properties), rather than on the structure of the facts themselves, as 
such. (I do think, though, that  pro tanto legal content strongly supervenes on prop-
ositional content. 63 ) Th is leaves constitution- and grounding-based views, then. 
 Although I do not pretend to say enough on this occasion to provide 
anything like a conclusive argument against constitution-based versions of the 
communicative-content theory, I do think that  – given the extensive sharing of 
properties required by constitutive explanations  – the properties needed in order 
to explain the interaction between  pro tanto legal content (in order to respond 
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to the Gappiness Problem) are probably too distinctive to warrant a constitution 
claim. While legal content has weight and is able to interact with other legal content 
in complex ways, propositions not only lack these properties, they seem not even 
to have any properties that manage to robustly help explain how legal content 
comes to have them, which makes me sceptical that legal content is constituted 
by communicative content. For a (crude) illustration of the problem, consider an 
analogous situation involving material constitution. Say that Statue 1 and Statue 
2  ‘ combine ’ to form Statue 3; the shape of Statue 3 still is what it is in virtue of 
being constituted by Lump 3 (the product of merging Lump 1 and Lump 2). Th ere 
is  – I submit  – no comparable story to be had in the case of a statute ’ s proposi-
tional content and its legal content. If that ’ s right, then the diff erence in properties 
between the two types of content simply seems too signifi cant for the determina-
tion relation to be as  ‘ tight ’ as constitution requires. Which leaves me with a view 
on which the legal content of a statute or constitutional clause is  grounded in  – 
rather than constituted by  – its communicative content. 
 C. Th e  ‘ Necessity ’ of the Communicative-content Th esis 
 For ease of exposition, I have allowed myself to simplify the discussion by 
abstracting away from particular modes of expression, but the version of the 
communicative-content theory proposed here specifi cally concerns statutes and 
constitutional clauses, so I will have to say something about the nature and role of 
(direct) linguistic expression and how it fi ts into the framework I have outlined. 
 As I have indicated, authority doesn ’ t require linguistic expression, as such. Nor 
does authoritative expression, by itself, create legal content. However, although the 
conventional  – and thus contingent  – rules at the foundation of a legal system 
cannot change the fact that law is authoritative, they can operate on such expres-
sion in at least two fundamental ways. I have put this in terms of the constitutive 
rules of the system determining  ‘ what counts as law ’ s expression ’, but there are 
two distinct  – albeit closely related  – aspects to this notion. On the one hand, 
conventional rules make it the case that authoritative expression produces law; 
on the other hand, they determine what forms of expression count, and whose. In 
determining what forms of expression count, and whose, modern legal systems 
generally establish a specifi c body of offi  cials primarily tasked with creating law 
and certain procedures by which these offi  cials settle on direct linguistic means of 
expressing their collective lawmaking choice. 
 Legislation, thus, on this picture, is ( contra Bach and Harnish (1979)) funda-
mentally a speech act of  two types: it is both an eff ective and a directive, to borrow 
terminology from speech act theory. 64 Eff ectives are conventional and so the 
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eff ective aspect of legislation does not  – as such  – depend on the communica-
tive intentions associated with the utterance (although it does arguably depend 
on at least some minimal intention to make law); directives are communicative 
and thus the directive aspect does depend on such intentions. In relation to the 
legislation ’ s eff ective aspect, it is important to (re)emphasise here that although 
convention determines that linguistic expression (following a specifi ed proce-
dure) counts as the right kind of expression for the purposes of law, that does 
not mean that the expression itself is determined by convention. Th at is, legal 
systems can shape the way in which they institutionalise authoritative expression 
in a myriad of ways, but they cannot change the directive nature of the relevant 
speech act. And  directive speech acts, as such, do depend on communicative 
intentions, both in that the speech act succeeds (in some relevant sense) by virtue 
of intention  recognition and  – what matters more to us here  – in that the content 
of the utterance is its communicative content. And  – on the picture I favour  – its 
communicative content, roughly, is the content that a competent, rational hearer 
would take the speaker to be intending to communicate in uttering the relevant 
words. 
 I ’ ll say more about communicative intention in  section III.E below, but we 
now have the main pillars of the argument for the communicative-content thesis, 
which we can summarise in the following way (for the sake of brevity, I do not 
present it as not a non-enthymematic deductive argument): 
 P1.  It is among the essential functions of law to help subjects better comply 
with the reasons that apply to them and the law does so by expressing views 
about how its subjects ought to behave. 
 P2.  When the law expresses a view about how its subjects ought to behave, the 
law creates an abstract normative entity (legal obligation, permission, power, 
etc, or some constellation thereof) that corresponds directly to the content 
expressed. 
 P3.  Th e legal content of the law ’ s expression about how its subjects ought to 
behave just is the abstract normative entity created by the law ’ s expression. 
 C1.  Th e legal content of the law ’ s expression corresponds directly to the propo-
sitional content expressed. 
 P4.  If C1 and the constitutive rules of a system determine that direct linguistic 
forms of expression, such as (the enactment of) statutes and/or constitutional 
clauses, count as law ’ s expression, then the legal content of such expression 
corresponds directly to the propositional content expressed. 
 P5.  Th e propositional content expressed by direct linguistic forms of expression 
is its communicative content (determined by reference to what a competent, 
rational hearer would take the speaker to be intending to communicate in 
uttering the relevant words). 
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 C2.  If the constitutive rules of a system determine that direct linguistic forms 
of expression, such as (the enactment of) statutes and/or constitutional 
clauses, count as law ’ s expression, then the legal content of such expression 
corresponds directly to its communicative content (determined by reference 
to what a competent, rational hearer would take the speaker to be intending to 
communicate in uttering the relevant words). 
 Given the modal status of P1 – P5, we can even take C2 to be a necessary truth, 
despite the fact that the communicative-content thesis, as stated at the outset of the 
chapter, is now conditioned on the existence of statutes and constitutional clauses. 
If what I have said is correct, it is a necessary truth, then, that if the law expresses 
views about how its subjects ought to behave via direct linguistic communica-
tion, then the legal obligations, powers, permissions, etc that those expressions 
contribute to the relevant body of law correspond directly to the communicative 
content of the relevant utterances. Accordingly, for those systems in which stat-
utes and/or constitutional clauses count as law ’ s expression, their legal content 
corresponds directly to their communicative content. 
 D. A (Worthwhile) Digression on Legal Positivism 
 Before I conclude with some remarks about communicative intention in the legis-
lative context, I want to digress briefl y, in order to address a signifi cant worry 
related to the view I have outlined. Th e worry, perhaps raised most forcefully by 
Plunkett (2019), is that in relying on a foundational premise about the nature of 
authority, the view cannot really count as positivist. 65 Facts about authority  – ie, 
facts about what it really is  – are presumably appropriately classifi ed as robustly 
normative facts, so if such facts are at the foundation of an account of the way in 
which legal content is grounded, it seems tempting to conclude that legal content 
is grounded in robust normative facts. While the issue is downstream from my 
immediate concerns in this chapter, a slight digression is still in order, I think. 
I do not have space to address the worry fully here, but I will sketch three promis-
ing ways to respond to it, at least as it arises in relation to the framework I have 
outlined above. 
 I should begin by noting that although it is for some purposes unproblematic 
to say  – as I have  – that law institutionalises authority, a more transparent way to 
express what I mean would be to say that legal systems institutionalise authoritative 
speech acts (well, authoritative expressions, more broadly, but for ease of exposi-
tion, I will focus here on speech acts). Setting aside wholesale scepticism about 
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authority, authoritative speech acts have some interesting, non-accidental relation 
to authority. It is hard to determine exactly what that relation is, but as a start-
ing point we can say that authoritative speech acts in some relevant sense  ‘ track ’ 
facts about authority, where such facts are facts with robust normative import and 
tracking indicates a non-contingent explanatory relation between those facts and 
the relevant type of speech act. It seems plausible enough to say  – again, setting 
aside wholesale scepticism about authority  – that authoritative speech acts are 
what they are in some relevant sense  because authority is what it is. Arguably, 
for example, it is non-accidental both that authoritative speech acts presuppose 
 standing and that they involve an intention that the utterance be accepted as a 
binding reason by the addressee (to do as directed). 66  Th at ’ s how authority works , 
we might say. 
 Assuming that facts about authority are robustly normative, is this enough to 
say that authoritative speech acts  – and thereby legal content  – metaphysically 
depend on robust normative facts ? It ’ s hard to say, but for our purposes here, an 
analogy will suffi  ce to show that we seem to have good reason to think that it 
isn ’ t. Consider belief-forming processes. It is common to claim that such processes 
are constitutively sensitive to some epistemically signifi cant feature, such as truth, 
justifi cation, or what have you, yet few would hold that particular beliefs result-
ing from these processes metaphysically depend on truth, justifi cation, etc. Th e 
relationship, while non-accidental, does not seem like outright metaphysical 
dependence  – at least not of the sort we are concerned with here. Analogously, 
even if authoritative speech acts constitutively track facts about authority, that 
does not entail that the legal content they (under certain conditions)  ‘ produce ’ 
metaphysically depends on robust normative facts, at least not in a way that threat-
ens positivism. Th e most plausible explanation, I think, is that  ‘ tracking ’, here, does 
not amount to grounding. 
 In case we are not satisfi ed with this response, however, and think that the 
relationship between robustly normative facts about authority and facts about 
authoritative speech acts does amount to grounding, the best way to respond to 
the worry is to consider the rather complex grounding story involved. On the 
proposed view, each particular instance of legal content is immediately grounded 
only in the (directly corresponding) communicative content. Th is grounding rela-
tion, in turn, is grounded in the system ’ s rule(s) of recognition along with the 
relevant speech act token. Th e worry, of course, is that the fact that the relevant 
speech act token is grounded in robust normative facts about authority means that 
this somehow  ‘ transmits ’ to the resulting legal content, such that legal content is 
mediately grounded in robust normative facts. Th e conventionality/ institutionality 
provided by the rule(s) of recognition, however, explains why this is not the case. 
In  ‘ producing ’ legal content, the relevant rules of the system do not operate on the 
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underlying robust normative facts (assuming for the sake of argument that this 
is the right way to characterise things)  – rather, they operate on the speech acts 
 ‘ directly ’, and this is enough to block the potentially problematic inference. 
 An analogy might be useful here. Let us assume that (in some jurisdictions) 
 marriage institutionalises a social-psychological phenomenon (or cluster thereof) 
which  ‘ tracks ’ something of robust normative signifi cance  – say, committed, 
caring, and perhaps intimate partnerships. And that, further, this  ‘ tracking ’ is 
robust enough for it to be plausible to say that the way we think and behave with 
respect to such partnerships (ie the social-psychological phenomenon) is partly 
grounded in their value. Declaring their commitment, for example, is something 
people in such relationships tend to do (at least in some cultures), and arguably for 
good reason. Moreover, such declarations, moreover, may be a constitutive part of 
the conditions for its institutional  ‘ counterpart ’ ), ie, a valid marriage; in England 
and Wales, for example, exchanging vows is a ceremonial requirement. Does it 
follow that each particular marriage is partly grounded in the robust normative 
facts about committed and caring partnerships ? I don ’ t think it does, the reason 
being  – as indicated above  – that the conventional rules that  ‘ produce ’ marriages 
operate directly on the social-psychological phenomenon, that is on the practice 
of  declaring commitment (where applicable), rather than on the robustly norma-
tive facts that partly ground them (if they do). A similar story goes for legal content, 
on the assumption  – made here for the sake of argument  – that robust normative 
facts partly ground the nature of authoritative speech acts. 
 We might still be worried that the above responses don ’ t change the fact that 
there is clearly  some signifi cant reliance on robust normative facts. Perhaps such 
facts do not explain the obtaining of legal content, but they do seem to play some 
role in explaining its  ‘ shape ’  – that is, that it directly corresponds to the commu-
nicative content of the relevant utterance. So perhaps facts about authority and 
the foundational conventions of the relevant legal system jointly ground the fact 
that specifi c kinds of utterances ground the fact that (the resulting) legal content is 
grounded in the communicative content of the utterance ? 
 I think that ’ s roughly correct, but still not enough to make trouble for positiv-
ism. Th e key, I think, is to recognise that not every fact that plays a grounding role 
in relation to some other fact is a ground of that fact. More specifi cally, I think that 
the following principle is false: if the fact that A grounds the fact that  < the fact 
that B grounds the fact that  < the fact that C grounds the fact that D > > , then the 
fact that A grounds the fact that D. In the context of facts about authority and the 
obtaining of legal content, this is indeed the case: facts about the nature of author-
ity, along with the fact that relevant rules of recognition obtain, ground the fact 
that speech acts of a certain sort ground the fact that their communicative content 
ground the fact that a corresponding legal norm obtains. Phew! As a result, we do 
 not get the implication that facts about the nature of authority ground the fact that 
a particular legal norm obtains, although they of course play an important role in 
the overall explanation of why legal norms obtain and, in particular, why they have 
the content that they do. 
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 I should note that my claim that the above principle is false is not pulled out 
of thin air  – an analogous principle for so-called  structuring causes fails as well. 67 
Consider a twist on the classic Dretske-type example of a thermostat controlling 
a furnace. Th e furnace may ignite (eff ect 1) because something in the thermostat 
triggered it, say, a switch closing the relevant circuit (triggering cause 1). But the 
structural conditions that enabled the triggering to happen, and the eff ect to come 
about, also had a cause  – say, the engineer ’ s hooking things up in the relevant 
way (structuring cause 1). Both are causes of the furnace igniting. Th e engineer ’ s 
actions (structuring cause 1/eff ect 2), in turn, were triggered by certain stimuli 
(triggering cause 2), given her mental state. Th e structural conditions provided 
by the engineer ’ s mental state, in turn, of course also had a cause (structuring 
cause 2). And so on. What matters for us here is that the cause of the engineer ’ s 
mental state (structuring cause 2) is neither a structuring cause nor a triggering 
cause of the furnace igniting (eff ect 1). 
 We might of course posit some additional type of cause to cover such relations, 
but better, I think, to conclude that it is not a cause of the furnace igniting, while 
of course acknowledging its causal relevance. We can say that causation  ‘ peters 
out ’, in some relevant sense, while causal relevance (arguably) does not. 68 Simi-
larly, in the case of legal content, we can acknowledge the metaphysical relevance 
of robustly normative facts about authority without having to thereby accept that 
such facts ground facts about legal content. Th is response to the grounding worry 
of course requires the dependency explanation to be complex enough for ground-
ing to peter out  ‘ in time ’, and it may thus not work for all jurisprudential accounts 
that rely on claims about authority, but it is in any case a promising strategy for the 
view presented here, I think. 
 E. Th e Problem of Collective Communicative Intention 
 So far, I have taken for granted the notion of law expressing things by means of 
linguistic communication. In this fi nal subsection, I want to say a bit about what 
I take this to involve, and stake out a middle ground between sceptics about legis-
lative intent and those who think we can provide a robust explanation of the way 
in which the intentions of lawmakers ground communicative content (and thereby 
legal content). 
 Sceptics about legislative intent tend to focus either on the metaphysical or the 
epistemological issues relating to collective intention. 69 Some argue that the very 
  67  For the classic account of triggering vs structuring causes, see Dretske (1988) and (1989). 
  68  Note that this is diff erent from the (complementary) kind of petering out proposed by Moore 
(2009). 
  69  For a range of well-known sceptical arguments, all discussed by Ekins (2012), see eg Radbruch 
(1910), Radin (1930), Dworkin (1986), Shepsle (1992) and Waldron (1999). In  ch 6 , I discuss some 
related worries, as they arise in debates about textualism. 
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idea of collective intention is incoherent  – to borrow a familiar phrase, the legis-
lature is a  ‘ they ’, not an  ‘ it ’. Others argue that even if small, close-knit groups can 
have collective attitudes, the same does not hold for legislatures, due in signifi cant 
part to the adversarial nature of the legislative institutions in modern democratic 
societies. And yet others argue that even if legislatures could have such attitudes, 
the actual, messy context of legislation in anything resembling contemporary 
legal systems would make it impossible for us to reliably ascertain the content 
of such attitudes. (Th e latter two points are not always clearly distinguished.) 
 Much has been written in response to these worries, most of which I will not 
address here, but I want to highlight  – and contrast my own view with  – one of the 
most thorough replies on off er, made recently by Richard Ekins. 70 Ekins argues 
that despite the messiness of legislative reality, legislators still manage to act in 
concert so as to produce certain crucial group attitudes, which  – importantly  – 
do not reduce to any aggregation of their individual intentions; on his account, 
the legislature is distinctively an  ‘ it ’, not a  ‘ they ’, then. And these attitudes, Ekins 
seems to think, are generally determinate enough to robustly ground commu-
nicative content, evidenced, for example, by his argument that the law contains 
a myriad of cases in which the legislature manages to communicate something 
(and thus make law) beyond the literal content of the enacted text. 
 In (very) simplifi ed terms, Ekins ’ s main move is to argue for a general philo-
sophical account on which individual intentions can  ‘ interlock ’ in ways that ground 
group intentions, and to show how that account applies to the legislative context in 
a way that explains how the legal content produced by the enactment of text corre-
sponds to the legislative act ’ s objective communicative content, ie, the linguistic 
content that a reasonable member of the relevant audience would, knowing the 
context and conversational background, associate with the enactment. Th e key, he 
argues, is to recognise that individual legislators have (among other things) certain 
so-called  we-intentions , individual intentions about a common goal and how to 
jointly achieve it. 71 In the legislative context, Ekins says, the relevant we-intentions 
produce (again, among other things) an irreducible, general intention to follow 
certain established procedures which constitutively determine what counts as 
more particular joint action (in the service of the common goal, which on Ekins ’ s 
account is to legislate for the common good). Th us, when a proposal successfully 
completes the (locally determined) legislative procedure, its enactment counts as 
an intentional act of the legislature, irrespective of individual legislators ’ inten-
tions (or lack thereof) on that particular occasion. Individual legislators may or 
may not contingently have such particular intentions, but vis- à -vis the legislative 
act itself, that ’ s neither here nor there, Ekins thinks; it ’ s part of the legislature ’ s 
general intention that legislative procedure is adopted as a way for legislators to 
jointly evaluate and select a proposal, the content of which is to be understood in 
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terms of its potential future promulgation. Th e content of legislation is thus deter-
mined by the linguistic content that a reasonable member of the community at 
large would, knowing the context and conversational background, associate with 
the enactment. Th is, I hope, is a faithful  – if woefully brief  – description of the 
main contours of Ekins ’ s view. 
 On this occasion, I can neither do the issue nor Ekins ’ s laudably detailed argu-
ments justice, but I do need to say something about legislative communicative 
intention(s) and in the service of doing so I think it is useful to fl ag some main 
points of agreement and disagreement with him. First, although I disagree with 
Ekins about the nature of the function at the root of the explanation for how the 
enactment of a text contributes to the content of the law via legislative procedure, 
we seem to agree that the existence and content of law (originating in the legisla-
ture) is explained in crucial part by the combination of some necessary function of 
legislation and certain contingent procedures adopted and used by the legislative 
body to accomplish that function. On the account I favour, law ’ s function (to help 
subjects better comply with the reasons that apply to them) entails that,  necessarily, 
lawmaking is an expressive act, while which forms of expression counts, and whose, 
is a contingent matter, settled by the legislative procedures adopted in each system. 
However, unlike on Ekins ’ s picture, on my account, the content of the legislature ’ s 
utterance is not determined by any particular communicative intention, grounded 
in a standing intention along with specifi c, unanimously adopted legislative 
procedures. For reasons duly emphasised by the sceptics, I think that  – at least in 
the actual world  – there is insuffi  cient agreement regarding what  legislators take 
themselves to be doing in following legislative procedure to warrant the conclu-
sion that the content of legislative changes in the law, and their promulgation, 
fully corresponds to the objective communicative content associated with the 
enactment of the text. Th at is, in the actual world, I don ’ t think it ’ s true that legisla-
tors conceive themselves to be jointly evaluating and voting on a proposal to be 
understood in terms of its potential future promulgation  – at least not to the 
extent required by Ekins ’ s own framework. 
 Moreover, even if they did, the type of group intentions at play would not suffi  ce 
to ground any particular communicative intentions. A legislature ’ s intention that 
the result of their adopted procedure  – the content of which is determined by the 
content that a rational and competent reader would associate with the proposal  – 
 count as the content selected and promulgated does not magically create a 
communicative (group) intention in any particular case. At best, the legislature ’ s 
general intention is an intention to be treated as having a particular communicative 
intention on specifi c occasions, which  – granted  – may create a  fi ctional intention, 
but it does not suffi  ce to ground any actual intention of that sort. However, as 
I read him, Ekins is aft er something more robust  – an actual intention irreduc-
ibly grounded in the we-intentions of individual legislators (along with legislative 
procedure). Th is, I assume, is what  – as a general matter  – he thinks it takes in 
order for an utterance to have content. 
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  72  I should note that some  – arguably, eg, Harnish (2005)  – take appeal to normative notions like 
 commitment to mean that the relevant speech cannot be categorised as communicative. But while that 
may be true in the sense that the success conditions in some sense no longer depend on correct uptake, 
it is still the case that the content of the speech act depends on warranted inference about the speaker ‘ s 
communicative intentions, which  – I think  – makes it communicative in a suffi  ciently robust sense 
(so as to merit the label). 
  73  For worries in this vein, see eg Greenberg (2010) and Levenbook (ms). 
 On the picture I favour, however, the legislature does not need to have 
any actual communicative intentions. Conventional rules determine that the 
legislature ’ s expression counts as law ’ s expression and that the legislature is 
in control of the procedure by which it selects the linguistic items used on 
particular occasions of expression, but the content of the resulting law is not 
constitutively determined by any actual intention of the legislature, or of individual 
legislators; rather, it is determined by the content to which the legislature  – 
by way of rationality  – commits itself in selecting and promulgating a particu-
lar text via its adopted procedures. And the content to which it thereby commits 
itself is  – as a general linguistic matter  – the linguistic content that a reasonable 
member of the relevant audience would, knowing the context and conversational 
background, infer that the legislature intended to communicate, in selecting and 
promulgating that text. 72 
 It is worth emphasising that while communicative content  – on my account  – is 
in some sense  ‘ objective ’, I still think that communicative intentions are indispen-
sable. I understand how it may seem that by embracing an objective account of 
communicative content, one signifi cantly demotes the notion of communicative 
content  – if the norms of rationality, along with any further particular norms 
present in the relevant context, do most of the work in determining the content 
of any given utterance, then why do we need to refer to  communicative intentions 
at all ? Why not just say that the relevant norms fi x the content of the utterance ? 73 
Th e answer, I think, is that in doing so we would simply be talking about some-
thing other than meanings/communicative content. At least at the level of theory, 
communication necessarily involves reference to such  intentions  – that ’ s just how 
communication works, on my view. We can of course oft en bypass such reference 
for practical purposes, but once we do so in a robust, metaphysically committed 
way, I think we are simply doing something other than  ‘ gauging ’ meaning. We can 
of course still talk about interpreting acts and about assigning them signifi cances, 
but I take that to be an analytically distinct activity. 
 Since communicative content is still determined  – partly, but crucially  – by 
reference to actual communicative intentions, the sceptics ’ worries will have some 
signifi cant consequences for how determinate we should take legislative content 
to be. I will discuss pragmatic indeterminacy in some detail in  chapter fi ve , but 
let me say that due in part to the issues highlighted by the sceptics, and in part to 
worries about lack of pragmatically relevant information in the legislative context, 
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I think that indeterminacy in legislative communicative content is fairly wide-
spread, even when the enacted text contains no extravagantly vague terms. In 
particular,  contra Ekins, I do not think that (determinate) non-literal legislative 
speech is as widespread as he seems to think. In fact, I think it is relatively rare. 
Th at does not mean, however, that I think the law is limited to the literal content 
of the language used. As I will argue in  chapter fi ve , the law is oft en indeterminate 
between its literal content and some pragmatic enrichment thereof; and even in 
those cases in which it seems clear that the legislature intended to communicate 
something non-literal, it is still oft en indeterminate what that enriched content is. 
To some, this no doubt seems like a problematic picture of law, both descriptively 
and normatively, but I hope to show that the legislative context actually doesn ’ t fare 
all that much worse than ordinary conversation in either respect. Indeterminacy, 
as it happens, is fairly widespread in communication generally; what matters more 
is that we have strategies for managing it. 
 
